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WHAT EQUITY, THE PROMISE ECONOMY, AND 
COGNITION MEAN FOR HOW FIDUCIARY LAW 
SHOULD DEVELOP 
H. Justin Pace* 
Scholarship on fiduciary law has long been divided into two camps: 
traditionalist and contractarian.  Those two camps have largely been talking 
past each other, however, because each fails to appreciate that there are 
really two distinct, coherent bodies of fiduciary law.  There are traditional 
fiduciary relationships rooted in equity and modern fiduciary relationships 
rooted in statute and contract.  Much of the confusion in the case law can be 
attributed to judges attempting to apply assumptions developed for 
traditional, equitable fiduciary relationships to statutory and contractual 
fiduciary relationships better suited for a modern economy built on 
promises. 
Scholars and judges should appreciate that there are two bodies of 
fiduciary law and that they require different approaches.  Rather than the 
top-down analysis that has typically been applied to traditional fiduciary 
obligations, judges should apply a bottom-up analysis to modern, statutory 
and contractual obligations.  That is, judges should perform a data-driven 
analysis that closely examines the relative statutory and contractual 
language.  This will better fit the needs of legislatures in providing for those 
fiduciary relationships and the needs of parties in entering into them.  The 
modern, statutory and contractual form of fiduciary obligation is a rational 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fiduciary obligation1 has a long history in the law.  Its roots are in equity 
dating back several centuries.  And that original conception of fiduciary 
obligation persists in recognizable form in, for example, the law of trusts, 
one of the original sources of fiduciary obligation.  But fiduciary obligation 
has spread into a diverse and large array of bodies of law as the economy has 
come to largely be made up of promises.  Where fiduciary obligation at its 
roots was equitable and judge-made, its modern iterations are typically 
created and defined by statute and by contract.  Questions of fiduciary 
obligation now most often come up in the context of business organization 
law.  In that context, the statutory and contractual roots and nature of the 
relevant fiduciary obligations are particularly important. 
Those equitable roots, though, continue to exercise a powerful influence 
over fiduciary law.  Although modern fiduciary obligation in the business 
organization context is a very different sort of animal, judges continue to talk 
about fiduciary obligation in much the same way.  The language used reflects 
how judges think about fiduciary obligation.  Too often a single set of 
assumptions are applied to what are in fact two distinct, coherent bodies of 
law.  This, in part, explains why existing arguments regarding fiduciary law 
are incomplete and unsatisfying, whether made by traditionalists who talk 
about fiduciary obligation in moral terms, focus on fiduciary obligation more 
broadly, and found their work in philosophy, or made by contractarians who 
talk about fiduciary obligation in contractual terms, focus on the business 
 
 1.  Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining a fiduciary as “1. A 
person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope 
of their relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and 
candor [ ].  2. One who must exercise a high standard of care in managing another’s money 
or property [ ].”) 
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organization law context, and found their work in economics. 
Fiduciary obligation grew from its narrow, equitable roots to extend to 
a wide variety of types of relationships.  Those relationships have included, 
among others, trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, guardian-ward, attorney-
client, corporate manager-corporation, majority shareholder-minority 
shareholder, partner-partner and partnership, bank-borrower, franchisor-
franchisee, investment advisor- and broker-client, ERISA plan 
administrator- and trustee-plan participants,2 executor- and administrator-
estate,3 physician- and psychiatrist-patient, union representative-union and -
union membership, and even husband-community property.4 
That growth, in part, came from the application by judges of equitable 
principles to new types of relationships, but it is also the result of expansion 
by statute and contract.  Fiduciary concepts have been borrowed from equity 
and “bolted on” to various bodies of law using statute and contract, and often 
redefined in the process.  This has given the flexibility needed to keep 
fiduciary obligation relevant in a changing economy where promises are 
more important than property.  These two distinct sources of fiduciary law 
have resulted in separate bodies of fiduciary law, a dichotomy that is 
underappreciated. 
In order to better understand why judges talk about fiduciary obligations 
the way they do and why it matters, it is helpful to understand not just the 
equitable roots of fiduciary obligation but also the concept of a “schema.”  
In psychology literature, schemas are “knowledge structures that are 
comprised of assumptions, expectations, and generic prior understandings.”5  
Despite the two sources of fiduciary law, judges tend to hold a single schema 
for fiduciary obligation that is only valid for equitable fiduciaries.  This is 
visible in the frequent appearance of morally inflected language, equitable 
reasoning, and reasoning by analogy in opinions by judges deciding 
questions of fiduciary obligation.  Contra to the assertions of contractarian 
scholars, those words matter.  The schema influences judicial decision-
making (as do other cognitive limitations).  However, because there are two 
distinct bodies of fiduciary obligation, the application of the schema where 
fiduciary obligation is created and defined by statute, contract, or both — 
especially in the business organization context — results in a judicial error 
rate that is higher than it should or could be. 
 
 2.  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 425, 429–34 (1993) (discussing the duty of loyalty and fiduciary duty in the context of 
trustee relationships). 
 3.  Gregory S. Alexander, Essay: A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1999). 
 4.  Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 796, 807, 817 (1983). 
 5.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 770. 
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I assert that a schema poorly suited for the second, modern type of 
fiduciary obligation is frequently used and that it should be discarded in 
analyzing those obligations to be replaced by “bottom-up” analysis.  I also 
argue that the modern statutory and contractual form of fiduciary obligation 
is a rational response to changes in the law and in the economy and to 
problems of design.  As the economy continues to grow and change, 
legislatures have and will continue to expand the relationships to which 
fiduciary obligations apply, and to customize those obligations.  This 
threatens to add cost associated with complexity; legislatures can mitigate 
this cost by leveraging existing fiduciary law.  And doing so is not in 
irreconcilable conflict with moral considerations. 
This paper is agnostic on the question of what the proper fiduciary 
duties in any given fiduciary relationship are.  Rather, the focus is on what 
schema judges use and how it affects their decision making and whether, 
from a 10,000-foot view, the modern statutory and contractual form of 
fiduciary obligation is a rational approach to modern needs.  This paper also 
brackets discussion of possible implications of some of the issues raised, 
such as the role of equity and remedies and the consequences in bankruptcy 
that classifying a claim as fiduciary or contractual may have.  Rather than 
trying to delineate a precise definition of what fiduciary relationships should 
be, this Article accepts that fiduciary obligations have been applied very 
broadly.  Finally, this article relies on a theoretical and doctrinal argument 
for the schema that judges apply to fiduciaries.  Empirical research using 
survey and experimental methods is warranted. 
Part I of this Article will explore the equitable roots of traditional 
fiduciary obligation and how that has shaped fiduciary law.  Part II will 
explore the increasing role of statute and contract in creating, defining, and 
limiting fiduciary obligations.  Part III will show why both traditionalist and 
contractarian explanations for fiduciary law are unsatisfactory.  Part IV will 
identify and critique the “schema” that judges apply when analyzing 
questions of fiduciary obligation and discuss other issues of cognition.  Part 
V will evaluate the modern, statutory and contractual form of fiduciary 
obligation in light of changes in the law and the economy and in light of 
design issues. 
I. HOW EQUITY SHAPED FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
Fiduciary obligation is one of the oldest concepts in American law to 
survive today in recognizable form.  The original fiduciaries — trustees, 
administrators, and bailees — have origins stretching back hundreds of 
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years.6  “The ‘use’ emerged during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in 
England, and the trust developed over the fourteenth through seventeenth 
centuries.”7  Fiduciary obligations date back at least to the fifteenth century 
and were originally principally applied in what came to be the trust context.8  
Early trust law development was heavily influenced by the needs of a device 
used for holding and transferring land within families because that was the 
source of most wealth at the time.9  Trusteeship was viewed as an honorary, 
not a mercenary, position.10  Langbein characterizes the trustees of the time 
as “gentlemen trustees” with few powers, few skills, and few duties beyond 
“lending their names for a conveyancing device.”11  This was feasible 
because of the relatively simplicity of trust assets and administration, again 
because trusts held real property. 
It was courts of equity, not of law, that originally developed fiduciary 
law.  The English Court of Chancery was originally not a court in the sense 
that it did not decide cases.12  Rather, it issued writs needed to sue in royal 
courts.13  But the Court of Chancery over time increasingly became viewed 
as an alternative to the royal courts when relief through those courts was not 
available.14  Accordingly, a body of procedure grew up around the 
Chancellor and Court of the Chancery, but it was a much more limited 
 
 6.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 795 (first citing 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §1 (3d ed. 
1967); then citing 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 155 (2d ed. 
1898); and then citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *395–96). 
 7.  Id. at 805 (citing 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§1.3–1.4 (3d ed. 1967)).  
 8.  See Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 263, 263 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) 
(“In particular by the fifteenth century many of the complaints were against “foeffees,” 
persons who held legal title for the benefit of another in a proto-trust (a “use,” usually for the 
purpose of avoiding the tax-like feudal incidents that would be owed the lord on an 
intergenerational transfer).”). 
 9.  John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 940 (2005). 
 10.  FRANCIS WILLIAMS SANDERS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND LAWS OF USES AND 
TRUSTS 256 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1791). 
 11.  Langbein, supra note 9, at 940–41 (citing John H. Langbein, The Contractarian 
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632–42 (1995)). 
 12.  Sam Bray, A Student’s Guide to the Meanings of “Equity,” OPEN SCIENCE 
FRAMEWORK, 4 (2016), https://osf.io/9vrjx/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4S-58NQ]. 
 13.  Id. at 4. 
 14.  See 6 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483–1558 
174 (2003) (“[A] party sometimes required a remedy in conscience when none was available 
at common law.”).  But see Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 997, 1005 (2015) (“[P]laintiffs, in order to obtain an equitable remedy, must 
first show that they have ‘no adequate remedy at law,’ sometimes called the ‘irreparable injury 
rule.’  The adequacy requirement is old, and it once served at least one clear purpose: when 
there was only a single English chancellor, he could avoid being overwhelmed by refusing to 
give relief where the law courts could do so adequately.”) (citations omitted). 
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procedure than that available in royal, or common law, courts.15  “[C]ase 
specificity” and “moral reasoning” were hallmarks of Court of Chancery 
reasoning.16  Moral reasoning was so central to its reasoning that equity 
courts were referred to as “courts of conscience” and the chancellor was 
referred to as “the keeper of the king’s conscience.”17 
Because equitable courts had little to no fact-finding ability, fiduciary 
rules were tailored to avoid the need for fact-finding.18  Hence, for example, 
the “no further inquiry” rule in trust administration.19  Under the no further 
inquiry rule, courts will not examine the fairness or benefit to the beneficiary 
of a conflicted transaction by the trustee.20  Once it is determined that the 
transaction is conflicted, there will be no further inquiry.  The rationale 
behind a refusal to examine whether conflicted transactions are in the 
beneficiary’s best interest becomes apparent when you consider that equity 
courts did not have any real ability to perform a further inquiry. 
Those procedural limitations persisted for centuries.  The English Court 
of Chancery’s fact-finding procedures were “profoundly defective” into the 
nineteenth century, with no provisions for confrontation or cross-
examination of witnesses or for demeanor evidence.21  The efforts to reform 
equitable procedure stretched from the 1820s to the 1930s and occurred both 
in England and in the United States.22 
Equity courts crossed the Atlantic.  The Delaware Constitution, for 
example, prohibits the Delaware legislature from limiting its equity court’s 
jurisdiction to less than that of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain.23  
 
 15.  Cf. Langbein, supra note 9, at 945–47 (describing the limitations of early equitable 
fact-finding and reform efforts) (citations omitted). 
 16.  Bray, supra note 12, at 5. 
 17.  Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 263. 
 18.  Cf. id. at 276 (“[T]he no further inquiry rule has a purpose beyond making up for 
historically bad fact finding procedures.”). 
 19.  Cf. Langbein, supra note 9, at 945–47 (describing the limitations of early equitable 
fact-finding and reform efforts) (citations omitted). 
 20.  Id. at 931–32. 
 21.  Id. at 945–46 (relying on 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373, *442–55; 
JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 154-59 (1960); 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 353–69 (3d ed. 1944); A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION 
BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 90–91 
(1914); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the 
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 59 (1980)). 
 22.  Id. at 947 (relying on Michael Lobban, Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the 
Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part I, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 389, 409–14 (2004); 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987)). 
 23.  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.  See also DuPont v. DuPont, 8 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951) 
(“We think the Constitutions of 1792, 1831 and 1897 intended to establish for the benefit of 
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A moral, rather than economic, view of trustees crossed with them.  Early 
U.S. courts expressed the view that trustees will wrong beneficiaries absent 
judicial intervention.  In 1844, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that 
“[b]etween two conflicting interests, it is easy to foresee, and all experience 
has shown whose interests will be neglected and sacrificed.”24  U.S. courts 
also continued to independently develop fiduciary law.  For example, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts replaced the existing “‘legal-list’ 
rule” governing trustee investment of trust assets with “a more flexible 
‘prudent-investor’ standard.”25 
From trusts, fiduciary obligation spread to many different types of 
relationships.  Fiduciary obligations in the trustee-beneficiary relationship 
date back at least to 1536.26  Fiduciary obligations in the principal-agent 
relationship date back to the end of the eighteenth century.27  Fiduciary 
obligations in the executor- and administrator-estate, conservator- and legal 
guardian-ward, and lawyer-client contexts all have a long history.28  In 
Delaware, corporate derivative actions are a “judicially-created doctrine” 
and “creature[s] of equity.”29  Both the corporate form and corporate 
derivative standing in Delaware pre-date the Delaware General Corporation 
Law statutes.30 
Even for fiduciary relationships with their roots in equity, judges have 
upheld some types of modifications or restrictions of fiduciary obligations.  
For example, an express provision in a trust agreement governs over the duty 
of loyalty, an express provision in a partnership agreement may waive the 
duty not to compete with the partnership, and an attorney’s client may waive 
 
the people of the state a tribunal to administer the remedies and principles of equity. . . . Its 
result is to establish by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution the irreducible minimum of 
the judiciary.”). 
 24.  Thorp v. McCullum, 6 Ill. 614, 626 (1844). 
 25.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaption?, 
79 OR. L. REV. 61, 74-75 (2000) (citing Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 
(1830)). 
 26.  1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §1 (4th ed. 1987) (discussing the enactment of the 
Statute of Uses, which prohibited uses that did not impose a duty on the trustee). 
 27.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 795 (citing Charles Claflin Allen, Agent and Servant 
Essentially Identical, 28 AM. L. REV. 9, 18 n.1 (1894)). 
 28.  See, e.g., Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 145 (1925) (labeling executors, 
administrators, guardians, and conservators as fiduciaries); Shearman v. Cooper, 294 Ill. 314, 
318 (1920) (categorizing administrators, executors, and attorneys as fiduciaries); Hull v. Burr, 
63 Fla. 440, 441 (1912) (quoting Florida statute that lists executors and guardians among types 
of fiduciaries); Fisher v. Bishop, 63 Sickels 25, 28 (N.Y. 1888) (categorizing attorneys, 
guardians, and trustees as fiduciaries). 
 29.  Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 201–02 (citing 13 FLETCHER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPS. § 940, at 30 (2004); R. Franklin Balotti & Jess A. Finkelstein, 1 THE 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPS. & BUS. ORGS. §13.10, at 13–20 (3d ed. 2008)). 
 30.  CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1044 (Del. 2011). 
PACE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  4:12 PM 
2018]  EQUITY, THE PROMISE ECONOMY, AND COGNITION 691 
 
the right to conflict-free representation.31 
It is also important to recognize that judges do continue to find fiduciary 
obligations based on the status and relationship of the parties.  The addition 
of fiduciary obligations to the physician-patient relationship, for example, is 
more modern.32  Similar fiduciary obligations were later applied to 
psychiatrists.33  In 1991, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the 
directors of a corporation serving as the general partner of a limited 
partnership owed fiduciary duties to the limited partnership.34  In doing so, 
the Court of Chancery did not engage in statutory analysis, but instead 
applied “general principles” and analogized to trust law.35  And, in 2001, a 
judge ruled that a professor owed fiduciary duties to one of his students on 
the basis of the authority of the professor and the vulnerability of the student, 
despite the presence of an agreement between the two.36  Some courts 
continue to suggest a very expansive application of fiduciary obligation 
where the relationship warrants it.37  Thus, although modern fiduciary law is 
more a creature of statute than equity, equity continues to play a role, and, as 





 31.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 429.  Of course, even fiduciary relationships 
such as these with equitable roots have come to be governed by statute, statutes that sometimes 
explicitly provide for waiver.  And in all three parties rely heavily on agreements. 
 32.  See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 
1965) (stating that “[i]t is axiomatic that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one” 
after, it should be noted, looking to the relevant state statutes for an expression of public 
policy); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (1967) (“The relationship of patient and 
physician is a fiduciary one of the highest degree. It involves every element of trust, 
confidence and good faith.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) 
(“The relationship of the parties here was one of trust and confidence out of which sprang a 
duty not to disclose. Defendant’s breach was not merely a broken contractual promise but a 
violation of a fiduciary responsibility to plaintiff implicit in and essential to the doctor-patient 
relation.”). 
 34.  In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
 35.  Id. at 48–49. 
 36.  Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 37.  See, e.g., Charles v. Onondaga Cmty. Coll., 418 N.Y.S.2d 718, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1979) (“A duty extraneous to the contract often exists where the contract results in or 
accompanies some relation between the parties out of which arises a duty of affirmative care 
as in cases involving bailor and bailee, public carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, 
lawyer and client, or principal and agent. Although in the case at bar there was concededly no 
relationship between plaintiff and defendants other than that of parties to the contract of 
employment, the absence of such relationship is not necessarily fatal to plaintiff’s claim.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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II. STATUTE AND CONTRACT’S INFLUENCE OVER FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATION 
Traditional, equitable fiduciary relationships remain quite common, but 
they have been overcome in importance in the economy, in case law, and in 
the literature by a different sort of fiduciary relationship.  While early 
fiduciary obligations were primarily judge-made, as they expanded, they 
were increasingly created and defined by statute.  Nowhere is this truer than 
in the limited liability company (LLC) context, but fiduciary obligations in 
the modern corporate and partnership context are also set and defined by 
statute, and statutory fiduciary relationships extend well beyond the business 
organization context.  The economic importance of these relationships has 
surged as corporations have grown to mammoth proportions38 and the 
popularity of the LLC has exploded.39  With the advent of the promise 
economy, wealth transitioned from something that primarily took the form 
of land to something that primarily takes the form of financial instruments 
and contractual rights.40  Business disputes and bankruptcies frequently lead 
to claims for breaches of fiduciary duties.41  Many of the modern leading 
cases address such relationships, as does much of the modern literature. 
Fiduciary obligation in the business organization context does have a 
long history, although its incorporation into statutory law has been a more 
recent phenomenon.  Some fiduciary duties date back to the creation of 
 
 38.  But see S.I. Strong, Congress & Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity 
Jurisdiction Post-Americold, 69 FLA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2017) (arguing that commercial 
trusts “operate as a functional equivalent to corporations[,] ‘dominate certain types of modern 
business and financial transactions[,]’ . . . and play a central role in the U.S. economy, holding 
trillions of dollars’ worth of assets and generating billions of dollars’ worth of annual 
income”) (citations omitted). 
 39.  See, e.g., H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware 
will Lead, but will Anyone Follow?, 16 NEV. L. J. 1085, 1086 (2016) (“LLCs now account for 
more business filings than corporations in twenty-nine states.”) (citing Sandra K. Miller, The 
Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While Minimizing Judicial Interference, 
87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 132 n.23 (2008)). 
 40.  Langbein, supra note 9, at 940 n.42 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).  See also Frankel, supra note 4, at 802 (“In our society, 
affluence is largely produced by interdependence . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 41.  See Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court 
and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 181, 181 (2015) (“Litigation against directors and officers is ubiquitous in 
bankruptcy courts.  Indeed, charges of director malfeasance and breach of fiduciary duty are 
leveled at the outset of many bankruptcy cases . . . .  [D]irector and officer litigation claims 
have become ‘bankruptcy litigation.’  The reason is fairly straightforward: suits alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty and the like are much more likely to be filed when a business strategy 
has failed . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
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partnerships and corporations.42  Partnerships date back at least to the 
thirteenth century.43  Corporations, as we know them today, date back at least 
to the seventeenth century.44  Some fiduciary duties came later.45  And some 
only came with the creation of new entity forms.46 
Fiduciary obligations in the business organization context were not 
originally created by statute.47  And, indeed, Delaware was slow in providing 
explicitly for fiduciary duties in its business organization laws, only doing 
so in the LLC context in 2013.48  Aspects such as the business judgment rule 
were created by courts, not legislatures.49  But states steadily began to update 
their business organization statutes to include fiduciary obligations.  As new 
entity forms were created providing for alternative business entities, 
including notably the LLC, fiduciary law in the business organization 
context broke free from equity and the common law and became a true body 
of statutory law. 
What happened, in effect, is that statute and contract were used to “bolt-
on” fiduciary obligation in a different context.  That is, the source of 
fiduciary obligation did not arise from the nature of the relationship of the 
parties or the external status of the parties but from the statute or contract 
itself.  And to extend the bolt-on analogy a bit further, the resulting law is 
not only customized by bolting-on fiduciary obligation but by modifying the 
contours of fiduciary obligation by statute and contract. 
Courts were slow to account for the shift in fiduciary law from an 
equitable basis to a statutory and contractual basis.  The famous teaching 
 
 42.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 795 (“In the business realm, the fiduciary duties of partners, 
corporate directors, and officers originated with the formation of partnerships and 
corporations.”) (footnote omitted).  See also Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 657–58 
(1881) (stressing that directors owe a fiduciary duty to their company); Koehler v. Black River 
Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1862) (holding that directors owe a fiduciary duty to 
stockholders). 
 43.  ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 10-11 (1968). 
 44.  WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS §1 (rev. perm. ed. 1974). 
 45.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 795–96 (“[M]ajority shareholders were not subjected to 
fiduciary duties until this century.”) (footnote omitted). 
 46.  The LLC did not exist at common law and is a product of statute.  CML V, LLC v. 
Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011). 
 47.  See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not 
trustees, [corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and 
its stockholders.”). 
 48.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2013) (“In any case not provided for in this 
chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary 
duties and the law merchant, shall govern.”). 
 49.  See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (“The ‘business 
judgment’ rule is a judicial creation . . . .”). 
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case Meinhard v. Salmon is an apt example.50  Meinhard and Salmon were 
partners, but then-Judge Cardozo explicitly referred to trustees and courts of 
equity in laying out the high duty owed.  He said that a “trustee is held to 
something stricter than the morals of the market place,” not a partner.51  He 
referenced the “[u]ncompromising rigidity [that] has been the attitude of 
courts of equity,” not courts of law.52  Having drawn that connection, he 
layered on more morally inflected language.  Partners owe a duty of “[n]ot 
honesty alone, but rather the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”53  
“Joint adventurers . . . owe to one another,” not the duty of loyalty, but “the 
duty of the finest loyalty.”54  That loyalty must be “undivided” and not 
subject to “the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular exception.”55  That high 
standard was necessary not only to differentiate fiduciary conduct from 
“forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world,” but to keep it “at a level 
higher than that trodden by the crowd.”56  All of this was built on a “tradition 
that is unbending and inveterate.”57  And only by refusing to make an 
exception — equitable characterization notwithstanding — could Judge 
Cardozo avoid consciously lowering the standard of conduct for 
fiduciaries.58  Meinhard and Salman had an agreement.  Cardozo ignored it.  
Instead Cardozo analogized Salmon to a trustee and his own court to one of 
equity, while disclaiming equity’s traditional discretion.59 
Fiduciary obligations have been created by statute outside of the 
business organization context.  The Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rules 
made brokers and dealers the fiduciaries of their customers.60  The Dodd-
Frank Act authorized the SEC to promulgate a uniform fiduciary standard 
for investment advisors, brokers, and dealers when providing personalized 
investment advice.61  The statutory power given to union leaders to represent 
workers in negotiations with management brought with it fiduciary 
obligations inferred by the courts.62  The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 
 
 50.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928). 
 51.  Id. at 464 (emphasis added). 
 52.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 463–64 (emphasis added). 
 55.  Id. at 464 (citation omitted). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 463–68.  See also Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption 
of Ends, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 99, 114 (2008) (“Cardozo was not hobbled by the shackles of 
contract—he disregarded the parties’ agreement and imposed extra-contractual fiduciary 
duties instead.”). 
 60.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 430. 
 61.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012). 
 62.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 796 (citing Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 
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explicitly established duties by “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other 
representatives of a labor organization” to the labor “organization and its 
members as a group.”63  In 1974, Congress created a statutory fiduciary 
scheme for pension and other employee benefit plans and trusts with the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).64  Regulators play a 
role as well.  A recently vacated Department of Labor rule raised the standard 
for brokers handling retirement accounts to a “best interests” standard.65 
States also began modifying traditional fiduciary law by statute, 
especially by adopting uniform acts.  States shifted estate administration, 
even by conflicted administrators, away from heavy court supervision by 
statute with the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969.66  States 
provided for conflicted surrogates to terminate life support by statute with 
the adoption of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act.67  States abrogated 
common law fiduciary obligation and allowed limited waiver of fiduciary 
duties for agents operating under a durable power of attorney with the 
adoption of the 2006 Uniform Power of Attorney Act, already adopted by 24 
states.68  States abrogated the sole interest rule — allowing it to be abridged 
by the terms of the trust — by statute with the Uniform Trust Code.69  State 
 
(1944); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976)).  See also Morrissey 
v. Curran, 423 F.2d 393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that legitimizing a breach of duty by 
amending the union’s constitution or bylaws was “inconsistent with the aims and purposes of 
the Fair Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.”). 
 63.  29 U.S.C. §501(a) (2010). 
 64.  29 U.S.C. §§1001–1461 (2012).  See also Langbein, supra note 9, at 950 (“Congress 
based ERISA on the law of trusts.”). 
 65.  Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 17-10238, at *26 (5th Cir. Mar. 
15, 2018) (vacating the fiduciary rule because, for example, its “interpretation of ‘investment 
advice fiduciary’ fatally conflicts with the statutory text and contemporary understandings”). 
 66.  See Langbein, supra note 9, at 941 (“Across the second half of the twentieth century, 
there has been a strong movement away from such court-supervised wealth transfers on death, 
on account of the expense, nuisance, and delay inherent in the procedure.  The animating 
reform of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969 was the shift to unsupervised probate 
administration.”) (citations omitted). 
 67.  See id. at 942 (“The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act empowers the spouse or 
another near relative of an incapacitated person to serve as the so-called surrogate, who 
decides whether to terminate the person’s life support.  Although this surrogate is empowered 
to make a life-or-death decision to withhold treatment, he or she typically has an adverse 
financial interest in the patient’s affairs . . . .  The legislation reflects a cost-benefit 
determination that the danger of the conflicted surrogate using his or her authority to 
extinguish the patient prematurely is outweighed by the benefits of empowering the person 
most likely to know the patient’s wishes and to have the patient’s best interest at heart.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 68.  UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 115 (2006).  State enactment numbers per the 
Uniform Law Commission website, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title= 
Power%20of%20Attorney [https://perma.cc/XR5V-V84K] (last visited on August 14, 2017). 
 69.  Langbein, supra note 9, at 938; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b)(1) (2010). 
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legislatures changed the rule regarding trustee investment of trust assets after 
the Great Depression by adopting the prudent investor rule70 and then 
updated the rule again to incorporate modern portfolio theory with the 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, promulgated in 1994 and adopted in all but 
seven states.71 
Until recently, Delaware did not explicitly provide for whether LLC 
managers owed duties to the LLC.72  The Delaware Court of Chancery 
addressed the issue in Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC.73  
Chancellor Strine looked to the language of Delaware’s LLC Act.74  But he 
also used equitable reasoning.  He noted that “the rules of equity apply in the 
LLC context by statutory mandate,” going on to look at the nature of the 
manager’s relationship with the LLC, including the discretion invested in the 
manager.75  Chancellor Strine ultimately concluded, albeit in dicta, that 
“default fiduciary duties do exist in the LLC context.”76 
As early as 1942, a court ruled that majority shareholders’ and directors’ 
duties to the corporation could be restricted by the corporate documents.77  
Legislatures have gone so far as to allow waiver of the duty of loyalty.78  
Most notably, the Delaware legislature amended the Delaware Corporation 
 
 70.  Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 75. 
 71.  Id. at 77 (citing UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT 2(b) (1994); John H. Langbein, The 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 643 
(1996)); State enactment numbers per the Uniform Law Commission website, http://www.u
niformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act [https://perma.cc/8G93-Y33T] 
(last visited on Feb. 28, 2018). In at least one state, the community property statute made a 
husband “a fiduciary in respect to his wife’s interest in the community . . . .”  Vai v. Bank of 
Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 336–37 (1961). 
 72.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2013). 
 73.  Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 74.  Id. at 850, 852. 
 75.  Id. at 850–51.  The Delaware Supreme Court criticized the Court of Chancery’s 
opinion on the issue of default fiduciary duties as dicta.  Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital 
Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1214, 1218 (Del. 2012).  
 76.  Auriga Capital Corp., 40 A.3d at 849–56. 
 77.  Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232–33 (1942) (holding that the majority 
shareholders/directors did not breach their duties to the corporation by causing and 
participating in an interested transaction, stressing that “in determining whether those who 
have power to control the corporation have committed a wrong either to the corporation or to 
its stockholders, the corporate capital structure, the certificate of incorporation, and the 
corporate constitution or by-laws may be factors of great weight; for, within limits prescribed 
by law, these define to whom the power of control is entrusted, its scope and the manner in 
which it must be exercised”). 
 78.  See, e.g., UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b) (2006); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78, cmt. C(2) (2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006) 
(allowing waivers of the duty of loyalty). See also Pace, supra 39, at 1095–133 (detailing 
LLC statutory provisions allowing waiver and LLC and LP case law upholding waiver 
provisions). 
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Act to allow waivers of the corporate opportunity doctrine.79  Even where 
waiver was not allowed, the prohibition was typically rooted in the language 
of the statute, not in equity.80  And when the Delaware Supreme Court 
suggested that the Delaware Limited Partnership (LP) Act did not allow the 
elimination, rather than just limitation, of fiduciary duties,81 the Delaware 
legislature responded by amending the Delaware LP Act to add the word 
“eliminate.”82  Waivers have proven quite popular.83  Principles of equity 
have, however, crept back into business organization law from time to time,84 
and shareholder suits for breach of fiduciary duty are still sometimes 
considered equitable85 and in Delaware are still brought before a court of 
 
 79.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2018).  At least eight states have followed 
Delaware’s lead.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102(q) (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§ 2-103(15) (West 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.385(16) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
78.070(8) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:3-1(q) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 1016(17) (West 2017); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.101(21) (West 2017); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 23B.02.020(5)(k) (West 2017). 
 80.  See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(i) (2010) 
(barring certain types of contractual protections against liability for investment advisors); 
Landrum-Griffin Act §501(a), 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (2010) (“A general exculpatory provision 
in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution 
of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties 
declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.”); ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) 
(2012) (“Except as [otherwise provided], any provision in an agreement or instrument which 
purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, 
or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.”). 
 81.  Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 
(Del. 2002). 
 82.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2014).  The Delaware legislature updated its 
LLC Act with the same language that year.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2014). 
 83.  See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of 
Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 
1123 (2017) (estimating from securities filings that over 6,000 of roughly 10,000 identified 
corporate filings disclose a limitation or waiver of the corporate opportunities doctrine); 
Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The Naked Fiduciary, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 910 
(2012) (finding the operating agreements of a majority of publicly traded LLCs modified or 
eliminated the duty of loyalty). 
 84.  See, e.g., Roland Int’l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Del. 1979) (holding 
that majority shareholder had a fiduciary obligation to minority shareholders that arose “from 
long-standing principles of equity and is superimposed on many sections of the Corporation 
Law . . . .”), overruled by Weinberger v. UPO, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983); Pappas 
v. Tzolis, 982 N.E.2d 576, 579 (N.Y. 2012) (ignoring a NY statute allowing for waiver in 
favor of a broader equitable rule that waivers of fiduciary duty are only enforceable where the 
releasing party is sophisticated and “the fiduciary relationship is no longer one of 
unquestioning trust”) (citing Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de 
C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 2011)). 
 85.  See Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 95 (“In most jurisdictions, suits by shareholders 
against corporate officers must be brought in equity, just like actions by beneficiaries against 
trustees.”). 
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equity.86 
Parties have taken advantage of this new, greater freedom with court 
approval in many states.  In Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery enforced an LLC operating agreement that disclaimed 
any fiduciary duties not expressly set forth elsewhere in the operating 
agreement and that did not provide for duties in any other provision.87  In 
Broussard v. Tipton, a Louisiana court upheld the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment on a breach of fiduciary duty claim on the basis of the 
LLC’s indemnity provision, which, in the court’s view, clearly eliminated 
any liability defendants may have had.88  In Clancy v. King, Maryland’s 
highest court held that the relevant limited partnership agreement expressly 
allowed the author Tom Clancy (a general partner) to compete with the 
limited partnership.89  In Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System v. 
Corti, the Delaware Court of Chancery refused to grant declaratory 
judgment, rejecting, at least at that stage, the plaintiff’s argument that a 
provision in the certificate of incorporation at issue was ineffective in 
limiting the corporate opportunity doctrine because it did not “specify” the 
renounced opportunities.90 
Parties in various types of business relationships have taken advantage 
of the ability to create and define fiduciary duties as well as to restrict them.  
In Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., the LLC operating 
agreement provided that conflicted transactions must have terms comparable 
to an arms-length transaction.91  In response to a conflicted transaction, the 
 
 86.  See, e.g., William T. Quillen and Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Court of 
Chancery 1792–1992 (1993), http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/history.aspx [https://p
erma.cc/G55X-X6Z6] (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) (discussing the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s history of deciding breach of fiduciary duty cases). 
 87.  Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *9–10 (Del. Ch. 
May 7, 2008). 
 88.  Broussard v. Tipton, No. 2013 CA 1268, 2014 WL 3559371, at *1–2 (La. Ct. App. 
Apr. 24, 2014). 
 89.  Clancy v. King, 954 A.2d 1092, 1095, 1101 (Md. 2008). 
 90.  Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System v. Corti, No. 3534-CC, 2009 WL 
2219260, at *18 (July 24, 2009) (unpublished).  See also In re Morton’s Restaurant Group, 
Inc. Shareholders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 663–72 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding that only a failure to 
act loyally or in good faith would preclude reliance on the exculpatory provision in the 
company’s certificate of incorporation). 
 91.  Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1212–13 (Del. 2012) 
(The relevant provision stated that “Neither the Manager nor any other Member shall be 
entitled to cause the Company to enter into any amendment of any of the Initial Affiliate 
Agreements which would increase the amounts paid by the Company pursuant thereto, or 
enter into any additional agreements with affiliates on terms and conditions which are less 
favorable to the Company than the terms and conditions of similar agreements which could 
then be entered into with arms-length third parties, without the consent of a majority of the 
non-affiliated Members (such majority to be deemed to be the holders of 66-2/3% of all 
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plaintiffs sued for both breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties.92  
The Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the ruling by the Court of Chancery 
that the operating agreement imposed fiduciary duties, specifically the entire 
fairness standard, adding that “[t]o impose fiduciary standards of conduct as 
a contractual matter, there is no requirement in Delaware that an LLC 
agreement use magic words, such as ‘entire fairness’ or ‘fiduciary duties.’”93  
Limited partners do not typically owe fiduciary duties to the respective 
limited partnership, but in Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor the Delaware 
Court of Chancery enforced a provision in the limited partnership agreement 
establishing just such a duty.94  Both the Delaware LLC Act and the 
Delaware LP Act explicitly provide for the expansion of fiduciary duties.95 
These relationships have economic bases different from that of 
traditional fiduciary relationships.  The former tend to be contractual, arms-
length, bargained-for, and subject to market discipline.  The latter tend to be 
information asymmetrical, involve large power disparities, and touch on 
important matters of public policy.  That is, the needs and circumstances of 
fiduciary relationships in business organization law are very different than 
those of traditional fiduciary duties.  Traditional fiduciary relationships have 
been depicted as vertical, with the beneficiary taking an inferior role and the 
fiduciary taking a dominant role.96  Modern fiduciaries in the business 
organization context, on the other hand, occupy relationships relative to their 
firms that more closely resemble the horizontal relationships of non-
 
Interests which are not held by affiliates of the person or entity that would be a party to the 
proposed agreement).”). 
 92.  Id. at 1212. 
 93.  Id. at 1213.  But see D. Gordon Smith, Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty, U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1783, 1784 (2014) (arguing that “the Delaware Supreme Court was confused 
about the proper relationship between fiduciary and contractual duties” and that “the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, properly understood, cannot be adopted contractually”). 
 94.  Canton Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, 724 A.2d 571, 574, 582 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating 
that upholding bargained-for fiduciary duties contained in limited partnership agreements is 
crucial to the orderly management and economic success of those limited partnerships). 
 95.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §18-1101(c) (2014) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity, 
a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
liability company or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or 
is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement, the member’s or manager’s or 
other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited 
liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability company agreement may not 
eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); § 17-1101(d) 
(“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including 
fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a 
party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s 
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; 
provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
 96.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 775. 
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fiduciary contracting parties.97 
Fiduciary law, then, has developed into two different bodies of law.  
Each is somewhat confusingly referred to as fiduciary law under the existing 
case law and literature.  Not only are explanations of both the traditionalist 
and contractarian camps in the literature incomplete, the third camp that 
argues that fiduciary law is atomistic and forms no coherent body of law is 
incorrect.98  Nor are these merely the same concept with different bases, but 
rather two distinct concepts.  Much of the confusion in the literature and case 
law can be clarified by understanding the development of those two concepts 
and by examining them through the lens of cognitive theory.  This Article 
will show how cognitive limitations hamper judges in evaluating questions 
of modern, statutory and contractual fiduciary obligation and why the 
modern, statutory and contractual approach is usually the best available 
approach. 
III. UNSATISFYING EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
There is a large body of scholarly literature on fiduciary law.  Fiduciary 
obligation has a reputation as one of the more elusive concepts in Anglo-
American law,”99 but scholars in the field can be roughly divided into two 
camps: traditionalist (or moralist or formalist or anti-contractarian) and 
contractarian (or contextualist).100 
The traditionalists want business organization fiduciaries to act like 
traditional, equitable fiduciaries.  They get the fiduciary concept right, but 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 37 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (1988) (“One could justifiably conclude that the law of 
fiduciary obligation is in significant respects atomistic.”) (footnote omitted).  Mistakenly 
labeling fiduciary law as atomistic is perhaps due to both a failure to appreciate the dual nature 
of fiduciary law and a failure to understand that its traditional roots are in equity, with all the 
flexibility that entails.  The statutory and contractual basis of the other type of fiduciary law 
also allows for tremendous variation. 
 99.  See, e.g., Robert Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 19 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (“This 
point explains the purported elusiveness of fiduciary doctrine”). 
 100.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 282 (“[C]ommentary is split between 
contextualizers and contractarians on the one hand and formalists and moralizers on the 
other.”); Kelli A. Alces, The Fiduciary Gap, 40 J. OF CORP. L. 351, 353–54 (2016) (labeling 
the “two dominant perspectives” as contractarians and anti-contractarians).  This article is 
limited to U.S. law and its English antecedents, but a similar debate is taking place among 
Canadian commentators.  Compare John Howard, Fiduciary Relations in Corporate Law, 19 
CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 1 (1991) (explaining contractarian views of fiduciary law) with Brian R. 
Cheffins, Law, Economics, and Morality: Contracting Out of Corporate Law Fiduciary 
Duties, 19 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 28 (1991) (advocating a moralist view of fiduciary law by 
highlighting the limitations of the contractarian view). 
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apply it where it does not belong.  The contractarians recognize that fiduciary 
duties in the business organization context are contractual in effect, if not in 
fact, but fail to appreciate the dissimilar nature of fiduciary obligations in 
different circumstances.  Neither concept (equitable or statutory-contractual) 
can fully explain modern fiduciary law.  There are fiduciary obligations that 
spring solely from equitable roots — i.e., based on the relationship of the 
parties and not any statutory or contractual basis.  And there are fiduciary 
obligations that arise absent any source in equity.  For example, directors of 
a corporation are fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders,101 but 
are not the agents of either.102  Thus, the traditionalist narrative is incomplete 
because fiduciary obligations often arise where there is no relationship of the 
sort creating fiduciary obligations in equity.103  The contractarian narrative is 
incomplete because fiduciary obligations can and do arise without any 
contractual or statutory basis.104 
A. Limits of Traditionalist Arguments 
The traditionalists look more to the roots of fiduciary obligation.  They 
tend to view fiduciary obligation in terms of equity or the common law.  They 
think of and talk about fiduciary obligations in moral terms and argue they 
have a moral component.  Additionally, they think of and talk about fiduciary 
obligation as its own body of law rather than a subset of another body of law, 
they are more likely to reject arguments that fiduciary obligations can or 
should be subject to limitation by agreement among the parties, and their 
literature tends to have its academic foundations in philosophy. 
Relationship between parties over intent.  DeMott defines fiduciary 
duties as “conventionally based on the existence of a relationship of trust and 
confidence when one party undertakes to give advice to another in more than 
 
 101.  Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co., CA. No. 11,820, 1992 WL 212587 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 
1992) (reported in 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 330 (1992)) (“Delaware directors are fiduciaries.”). 
 102.  Mgmt. Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that 
corporate directors are not agents of the corporation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§1.01 cmt. f(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (stating that corporate directors are not agents of the 
corporation’s shareholders).  But see CAL. CORPS. CODE §317(a) (defining “agent” to include 
corporate directors). 
 103.  See, e.g., Alces, supra note 100, at 364 (“[P]arties can voluntarily import the body 
of fiduciary law to fill the gaps in their contracts.”). 
 104.  See id. at 363–64 (“Contractarians assert that all fiduciary relationships must be 
based on a voluntary interaction that at least resembles a contract, and anti-contractarians 
point out that such a strict model fails to explain the many cases where fiduciary duties are 
applied without an express agreement or a contract containing a fiduciary term.”).  See also 
Laby, supra note 59, at 110–29 (critiquing the limitations of the contractual approach); 
Frankel, supra note 4, at 813 (“[F]iduciary relations are not necessarily contractual.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
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an incidental or casual manner.”105  In her article rooting fiduciary duties in 
expectations of loyalty, DeMott gives as an example where the nature of the 
fiduciary relationship or the role occupied by the fiduciary or entrustor 
prevents self-protection by the entrustor.106  Moreover, DeMott sees 
entrustors’ expectations of loyal conduct as justifiable on the basis of the 
similarity of their relationship with conventional fiduciary relationships.107  
Frankel argues that judges look not to the intent of the parties, but rather to 
“whether the arrangement formed by the parties meets the criteria for 
classification as fiduciary” in deciding if fiduciary duties apply.108  Gordon 
Smith claims that judges usually impose the fiduciary duty of loyalty without 
regard to any contract.109  And traditionalists accept that fiduciary 
relationships may be formed even absent the agreement and intent of the 
parties.110 
Power imbalances.  Those types of relationships tend to be marked by 
power imbalances, a major point of concern for traditionalist scholars.  The 
trustee-beneficiary and executor-beneficiary are vertical relationships that 
resemble master-servant and parent-child relationships.111  Those 
relationships involve structural power imbalances because the subordinate 
party is usually passive and their exit options are highly constrained and 
because the intimacy of the relationship disguises abuse by the dominant 
party.112  There are often wildly different degrees of knowledge and 
sophistication between the parties.113 
 
 105.  Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of 
Loyalty & Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L.R. 925, 950 (2006) (emphasis added).  See also 
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1289 (2011) 
(arguing fiduciary relationships are rooted in trust).  But see Alces, supra note 100, at 377 
(“[W]here there are no explicit fiduciary duties, and the parties have not arranged themselves 
in a kind of relationship that is traditionally considered fiduciary, it may be impossible to 
determine which party is the trusting party and which is the trusted party until one of them is 
disappointed.”). 
 106.  DeMott, supra note 105 at 945.  There is no single term in general use for the 
counterpart to the fiduciary.  Where a general term is needed, I will borrow “entrustor” from 
Tamar Frankel’s Fiduciary Law, supra note 4. 
 107.  Demott, supra note 105, at 945. 
 108.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 821. 
 109.  Gordon Smith, supra note 93, at 1787. 
 110.  DeMott, supra, note 98, at 887 (“[O]nce a court concludes that a particular 
relationship has a fiduciary character, the parties’ manifest intention does not control their 
obligations to each other as dispositively as it does under a contract analysis.”).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §874 cmt. a (1979) (defining a fiduciary relationship as 
existing “between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or give advice for 
the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §2 (1959)). 
 111.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 777. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Williams, supra note 100, at 361 (citing Tamar Frankel, supra note 4, at 833; 
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Potential for opportunism.  With those power imbalances come the 
potential for opportunism.  According to Weinrib, that the entrustor is at the 
mercy of the fiduciary’s discretion is the hallmark of fiduciary 
relationships.114  Henry Smith sees fiduciary relationships as carrying 
abnormal potential for opportunism.115  Traditionalists fear that, absent 
judges taking a more equitable role, opportunists will take advantage of the 
judicial process.116  They see that potential for opportunism as a justification 
for judicial intervention.117  And they see this as endemic.  For example, 
Frankel argues that “all fiduciary relations give rise to the problem of abuse 
of power,”118 and Gordon Smith argues that entrustors “are always 
vulnerable to opportunism.”119 
Traditionalist scholars also tie judicial intervention very closely to that 
problem of abuse of power.  For example, Frankel argues that judicial 
intervention in the union official-employee relationship should be calibrated 
based on union members’ ability to control their officials and thus prevent 
abuse.120  Traditionalists are leery of “loosening traditional stringent rules 
about fiduciary duties” — for example, by allowing for waiver in 
organizational documents — because of those equitable, anti-opportunism 
roots.121 
Expression of social norms.  Leslie characterizes fiduciary obligation 
as an expression of social norms that would be stripped of moral force in an 
opt-out scheme.122  Those effects will in some circumstances be mitigated by 
 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behav. Found, of Corp. 
L., 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1739–40 (2001)). 
 114.  Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 7 (1975).  
 115.  Smith, supra note 8, at 262. 
 116.  Id. at 264. 
 117.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 816 (“Because the entrustor cannot satisfactorily protect 
himself . . . the law must intervene to protect him from abuse of power[.]”). 
 118.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 807 (emphasis added). 
 119.  Gordon Smith, supra note 93, at 1786 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 120.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 807. 
 121.  Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 275. 
 122.  See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default 
Rules, 94 GEO. L. J. 67, 89 (2005) (“[F]iduciary duty law supports and reinforces social norms 
that require trustees to act with care and to refrain from self-dealing.  Characterizing fiduciary 
duties as optional strips fiduciary duties of moral force and would, over time, weaken the 
social norms embodied in those duties.”).  See also Alces, supra note 100, at 373 (“The 
Delaware Supreme Court’s use of moral rhetoric to admonish corporate directors may indeed 
serve an expressive function of setting norms for best practices and ways in which those 
directors ought to behave.”) (citing Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1619, 1696 (2001)).  This view is not irreconcilable with a limited modification regime if we 
recognize that sometimes fiduciary obligations represent social norms and sometimes they do 
not.  See also supra Part VI (discussing how the imperfect incentives provided by contractual 
penalties suggest that morality and social norms should still play a role in fiduciary law). 
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market forces.123  Frankel, on the other hand, sees fiduciary obligation as 
replacing weakened social controls.124  But Frankel also sees a direct tension 
between market pressures and moral intuition in the fiduciary context.125 
Equitable roots.  The traditionalists not only think of fiduciary 
obligation in moral-philosophical terms but also in terms of its equitable 
roots.  What concerns us here is not the law-equity divide and attendant 
debate.  But the remnants of the law-equity divide have ramifications for 
modern fiduciary obligation.  Equity has a long, close history with moral 
language.  Equity can fairly be defined not just as “[t]he doctrines and 
remedies developed in the English courts of equity” but also as “[a] moral 
reading of the law.”126  Henry Smith not only categorizes fiduciary law as 
equitable but as “perhaps the most important and characteristic branch” of 
equity.127  To Smith, fiduciary law counters opportunism by acting as a 
“safety valve.”128 
The equitable roots of fiduciary obligation show in part why it is not an 
entirely incoherent, atomistic body of law, as some scholars have 
maintained.129  On the contrary, according to Henry Smith, equity’s 
approaches, which are status- or fact-based, will not produce “a single 
principle, let alone a rule,” because different statuses and facts produce 
different types of opportunism.130 
Moral Basis.  Henry Smith, in explicitly tying fiduciary law to equity, 
also ties equity to “natural law and natural justice.”131  As such, it is infused 
with moral norms.132  The danger of misbehavior is inherent because 
entrustment and vulnerability are part and parcel to the relationship.133  But 
as Smith notes, fiduciary law is broader than general equity because a court 
will find a violation of fiduciary duty where there is no disproportionate 
hardship nor intent.134  In other words, “fiduciary law is moral but not 
 
 123.  Leslie, supra note 122, at 92. 
 124.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 802–03. 
 125.  Id. at 815 (“[A] market for fiduciary services reduces the moral stature and the public 
service image of professional fiduciaries.”). 
 126.  Bray, supra note 12, at 1. 
 127.  Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 261. 
 128.  Id. at 262. 
 129.  See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 98, at 915 (“One could justifiably conclude that the 
law of fiduciary obligation is in significant respects atomistic.”).  
 130.  Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 277.  Smith’s “fact-based approaches” look very much 
like the status-based approaches as used in this article.  E.g., “The facts in question usually 
relate to one party’s vulnerability and the discretion wielded by the candidate for fiduciary.”  
Id. at 278. 
 131.  Id. at 263. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 272. 
 134.  Id. 
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unboundedly so.”135 
The moral and the equitable are not unrelated.  Henry Smith notes that, 
like equity, “fiduciary law is often untailored and morally inflected.”136  
Smith points to Judge Cardozo’s famous language in Meinhard v. Salmon as 
simply “a stronger version of the morals reflected in equity.”137  Not only are 
fiduciary obligations articulated in moral terms, scholars in the traditionalist 
camp see fiduciary law as both fixed and mandatory.138  Frankel points to the 
jurisdictional authority that ecclesiastical and equity courts historically held 
over fiduciaries as a rationale for incorporating morality into fiduciary law.139 
Laby views fiduciary obligation through the prism of deontological 
moral theory.140  That is, whether a moral duty requires, permits, or prohibits 
an act, regardless of the consequences of that act.141  Other scholars tie equity 
in closely with morality.142  The potential for opportunism has been explicitly 
tied to morality.  It is worse from a moral perspective to injure someone who 
cannot protect themselves than it is to injure someone who can.143 
Limits of traditionalist arguments.  Moral reasoning notwithstanding, 
the traditionalists acknowledge an importantly contractual component to 
fiduciary law.144  And traditionalists have admitted many of the arguments 
of the contractarians.  For example, there is a recognition that the entrustor 
and fiduciary do not typically, or at least necessarily, enter the relationship 
with unequal bargaining power — the entrustor’s vulnerability arises after 
the relationship is formed.145 
The strict approach that courts have traditionally taken to enforcing the 
duty of loyalty is based on the vertical character of the relationship between 
the property fiduciary and the beneficiary.146  Given the typically horizontal 
character of fiduciary relationships in the business organization law context, 
that rationale erodes.  Some traditionalists acknowledge this.  Henry Smith 
admits that the rationale for tailoring presumptions to counter the danger of 
opportunism is weaker where the danger of opportunism is not as high, 
 
 135.  Id. 281. 
 136.  Id. at 272. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 1. 
 139.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 831. 
 140.  Laby, supra note 59, at 129. 
 141.  Id. (citing Stephen Darwal, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 81 (1998); Shelly Kagan, 
NORMATIVE ETHICS 73 (1998)). 
 142.  See Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 279 (“Common sense morality goes some way 
toward cabining equity[.]”). 
 143.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 832. 
 144.  See, e.g., Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 24 (“[F]iduciary law is mostly but not entirely 
contractarian.”). 
 145.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 810.   
 146.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 776. 
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giving as an example the business judgment rule.147 
Traditionalists make economic arguments of their own.  Gold argues 
that tying fiduciary obligation more closely to moral intuitions could increase 
efficiency and compliance.148  Gold also argues that the much larger number 
of parties potentially involved in the business organization context make 
tying fiduciary obligations to moral intuitions more important because of 
coordination problems.149  Variation or limits on fiduciary obligations may 
create negative externalities that are borne by all trusts,150 thus restrictions 
on modification or waiver of fiduciary duties may be justified as necessary 
to limit negative externalities.151 
That traditionalists feel compelled to make economic arguments of their 
own and to recognize the role of contract shows that the traditionalist view 
has incomplete explanatory power.  The economic explanation of fiduciary 
law is more satisfactory than a philosophical explanation, especially 
regarding modern fiduciary law.  The traditionalist approach is poorly suited 
for explaining fiduciaries in business organizations.  It does not give a 
satisfactory explanation for why sophisticated parties dealing at arms-length 
should be restricted from modifying their fiduciary obligations to each other.  
And it fails to recognize the enormous role that statute plays in fiduciary law 
today and what that means. 
B. Limits of Contractarian Arguments 
Opposite the traditionalists stand the contractarians.  The contractarians 
look more to the modern iterations of fiduciary obligation.  They tend to view 
fiduciary obligation in terms of statutory law and contract.  They think of 
and talk about fiduciary obligation in economic terms and reject any moral 
component to fiduciary obligation.152  They tend to treat fiduciary obligation 
 
 147.  Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 274. 
 148.  Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corp. L., 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
457, 503 (2009) (citing Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 713–19 (2007); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corp. L. and Social Norms, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1272–73 (1999); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The 
Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1840–41 (1998); Paul Robinson & John 
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997)). 
 149.  Id. at 508. 
 150.  Leslie, supra note 122, at 89. 
 151.  Id. (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the L. 
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 25–34 (2000); Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corp. L., 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1568–70 
(1989)). 
 152.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 427 (“Fiduciary duties . . . have no moral 
footing.”). 
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as a subset of business organization law and to talk about it in that context.  
They are amenable to and proponents of limiting fiduciary obligation by 
contract.  And the literature tends to have its academic foundations in 
economics.153 
Economic, not moral, basis.  Easterbrook and Fischel argue fiduciary 
duties are not special and have no moral footing but rather that “they are the 
same sorts of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other 
contractual undertakings.”154  Easterbrook and Fischel see fiduciary 
relationships as contractual relationships with particularly high transaction 
costs.155  Under this view, fiduciary law should be based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, looking in the aggregate and from an ex ante perspective.156  Under 
economic rather than moral reasoning, some conflicts should not be 
prohibited because compliance costs of prohibition make prohibition too 
costly or because the conflicts are in fact benign.157  Contractarians see 
evidence of economic reasoning in the development of modern fiduciary 
law.158 
The contractarians argue that the morally inflected language so often 
found in fiduciary obligation cases is not only dicta but ignored and 
irrelevant.159  The contractarians are critical of morally inflected language in 
court opinions dealing with fiduciary obligations.  Simply put, contractarians 
accuse courts of failing to practice what they preach, instead analyzing 
fiduciary relationships just as they analyze nonfiduciary contractual 
relationships.160  Contractarians also criticize the morally inflected rhetoric 
of judges and the traditionalists on other grounds.  Two examples include, 
because it “encourages beneficiaries to over trust,”161 and because offers of 
 
 153.  The seminal works on the economics of fiduciary obligation are by Robert Cooter 
and Bradley J. Freedman and by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel.  Robert Cooter 
& Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal 
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2. 
 154.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 427. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 9, at 937 (arguing consumer protection authorities do 
not follow the sole interest rule used in trust law for just that reason). 
 157.  Id. at 938. 
 158.  See, e.g., Id. at 939–43 (arguing that adoption of rules allowing reasonable trustee 
compensation, moving away from court supervised estate administration, and allowing 
conflicted persons to be appointed as health care surrogates empowered to terminate a 
person’s life support all reflect cost-benefit judgments). 
 159.  See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 429 (“[W]e seek knowledge of 
when fiduciary duties arise and what form they take, not a theory of rhetoric—a theory of 
what judges do, not of explanations they give.”).  See also Williams, supra note 100, at 373 
(“[S]uch flowery descriptions of affirmative devotion are not the basis of liability.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 160.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 767. 
 161.  Williams, supra note 100, at 370. 
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devotion by fiduciaries are not enforceable.162 
Information asymmetries.  Entrustors tend to rely on the discretion of 
the fiduciary.163  Discretion is important in the literature.  Ribstein argues that 
fiduciary obligation arises from the delegation of managerial discretion — 
without corresponding economic rights — by a property owner to a 
manager.164  Gordon Smith uses a similar formulation, arguing that fiduciary 
obligation arises from one party giving another discretion and control over a 
“critical resource.”165  That discretion, though, creates information 
asymmetry between the fiduciary and the entrustor.  Relying on the 
fiduciary’s discretion, expertise, or likely both, the entrustor is not positioned 
to effectively monitor the fiduciary,166 providing an economic justification 
for fiduciary obligation.  That information asymmetry can only partly be 
mitigated by retention of counsel.167 
Market constraints.  Contractarians see market constraints as 
lessening the need for strict fiduciary obligations.  Those constraints 
disincentivize corporations from deviating from standard terms if those 
deviations would reduce the corporation’s share price.168  Shareholders in 
publicly traded corporations have a powerful tool for market discipline — 
easy exit.169  And, market constraints are not limited to post-formation 
market pressures.  Contractarians put great weight on the fact that the 
fiduciary and entrustor typically enter into their relationship voluntarily and 
for gain through a contract or at least a contract-like process.170  That is, of 
course, a form of market restraint. 
 
 162.  See id. at 372 (“While fiduciaries may advertise their extreme care, dedication, 
expertise, and superior judgment and a beneficiary may rely on the expectation that the 
fiduciary will be devoted to her cause when entering the relationship, devotion is not an 
enforceable term.”). 
 163.  Williams, supra note 100, at 357 (The entrustor “relies heavily on the fiduciary’s 
discretion.”). 
 164.  Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 901 (2011). 
 165.  D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399, 1402 (2002). 
 166.  See Williams, supra note 100, at 357 (“The beneficiary is generally unable to monitor 
the fiduciary closely because she lacks the time and/or expertise to do so.”) (citing Larry E. 
Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 216 (2005)). 
 167.  See Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager 
After more than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 583–86 (2007) (using 
survey results to argue that majority investors are more often represented by counsel than 
minority investors, that LLC agreements are often not extensively negotiated, and that many 
attorneys have only a limited familiarity with the relevant statutory provisions). 
 168.  Leslie, supra note 122, at 92–93. 
 169.  Manuel Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 
571 (1995) (“[N]o agreement may be forced on either party, given that each party can choose 
to exit the corporation.”). 
 170.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 426. 
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Agency costs.  Fiduciary law is becoming more popular with regulators 
attempting to mitigate the agency problem.171  One approach is 
disempowerment.  Disempowering approaches include disallowing a trustee 
from engaging in market transactions over the trust property, terminating an 
agent’s authority on the incapacity of the principal, and disabling a 
corporation from undertaking any activity beyond the limited purpose laid 
out in the corporate charter under the ultra vires doctrine.172  We have already 
discussed one type of agency cost in the fiduciary obligation context — 
monitoring.  According to Sitkoff, fiduciary law is a deterrence system that 
mitigates agency costs by providing a vehicle for courts to complete a 
contract after the fact; accordingly, “[f]iduciary duties yield to the contrary 
agreement of the parties.”173  The duties of loyalty and care are couched in 
open-ended, expansive terms because of the agency costs due to incomplete 
contracting.174 
Gap-filling measure.  Contractarians treat fiduciary duties as gap-
fillers.  Sitkoff describes fiduciary obligations as principles courts use to 
judge a fiduciary’s actions against “what the parties would have agreed if 
they had been able to anticipate those facts and circumstances.”175  That is, 
fiduciary duties function as implicit contract terms that only apply where 
there is no explicit contractual provision.  Contractarians view this as 
necessary because it is impossible for parties to write contracts that cover the 
universe of their intended obligations.176  Fiduciary duties are presumptive 
contract terms that promote the parties’ welfare where express provisions are 
absent.177  This stands in stark contrast to the view that a fiduciary duty is a 
“pre-existing moral or ethical obligation.”178 
The traditionalists sometimes use gap-filling language as well.179  For 
example, Leslie defines contractual fiduciary duties as a gap-filling measure 
that attempts to predict not just “the terms that the parties would have agreed 
to ex ante,” but the terms they would have agreed to ex ante if bargaining 
 
 171.  Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 
1042 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 172.  See id. (describing disempowerment as a failed strategy for addressing agency 
problems). 
 173.  Id. at 1045. 
 174.  Id. at 1044. 
 175.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 176.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 426 (citations omitted). 
 177.  Id. at 431.  Easterbrook and Fischel go so far as to label this as “all but inevitable” 
and any alternatives as “self-defeating.” 
 178.  Leslie, supra note 122, at 73. 
 179.  See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 825 (“The courts can provide protection to the 
entrustor by imposing . . . the fiduciary obligations the parties would have agreed upon if the 
cost of contracting or the nature of the relation had not precluded them from doing so.”). 
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was costless and they anticipated the future conflict.180  But, of course, 
bargaining is not costless. 
If fiduciary obligations are gap fillers addressing transaction costs that 
lead to the problem of incomplete contract, then they are no longer necessary 
when the agreement covers the presumed gaps.  The same logic applies 
where a statute fills the gaps. 
Limits of the contractarian arguments.  But fiduciary law in the 
business organization context cannot be viewed as entirely contractual.  
While initial corporate charters can be viewed as contracts, charter 
amendments cannot.181  This would include charter amendments that modify 
fiduciary duties.  Heminway questions whether LLC operating agreements 
can be properly characterized as contracts.182  And even committed 
contractarians see a limit.  Sitkoff, for example, puts it in economic terms: 
“[T]he mandatory core insulates fiduciary obligations that the law assumes 
would not be bargained away by a fully informed, sophisticated principal.”183  
That view, though, invites judges and commentators to simply label any 
party that does bargain away core fiduciary duties as either ill-informed or 
unsophisticated. 
The contractarian view is unsatisfying in that it fails to account for the 
historical and continuing role of equity in the development of fiduciary law.  
It is overly focused on contract at the expense of statute.  And, most of all, 
the contractarian view does not give proper credence to the morally inflected 
language judges use when writing about fiduciaries.  To properly appreciate 
the importance of that language we need to consider cognition. 
IV. COGNITION AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 
Moving beyond the limited traditionalist and contractarian 
explanations, one way in which fiduciary law can be better understood is by 
considering issues of cognition, especially the “schema.”  Judges are human 
and subject to the same cognitive processes and limitations as any other 
human decision-maker.  Accordingly, we can learn more about the 
development of the law by exploring human cognition.184  Schemas are one 
 
 180.  Leslie, supra note 122, at 79 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991)). 
 181.  Lucian Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1989). 
 182.  Joan Heminway, The Ties That Bind: LLC Operating Agreements as Binding 
Commitments, 68 SMU L. REV. 811, 812 (2015) (“[A]n operating agreement may not 
constitute a contract at common law, and state LLC laws do not expressly label an operating 
agreement a statutory contract.”). 
 183.  Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 1047. 
 184.  Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 62. 
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of those relevant cognitive processes.  Schema “describe our expectations 
about, for example, people, entities, or social groups” and “represent 
knowledge about a concept . . . includ[ing] the concept’s attributes and the 
relations among them.”185  In layman’s terms, it is a preconceived notion. 
I argue that a single schema is most typically associated with fiduciary 
obligation.  That schema is in keeping with the traditional roots of fiduciary 
obligation.  It is associated with hierarchical relationships.  Fiduciary 
obligation was first concerned with relationships such as the trustee-
beneficiary relationship, where the trustee was in a position of power relative 
to the beneficiary.  I have identified three hallmarks of judicial decision-
making driven by a schema for fiduciaries — morally inflected language, 
equitable reasoning, and reasoning by analogy.  I will give examples of each 
showing up in cases where the judge made an error related to fiduciary 
obligation.  We look first to the language used by judges in talking about 
fiduciary obligation. 
Morally inflected language.  Contractarians argue that judges’ use of 
morally inflected language in cases such as Meinhard v. Salman does not 
square with the realities of fiduciary obligation.  Why, then, has similar 
language so often appeared in cases discussing fiduciary obligation?  There 
are innumerable examples.  I will give a couple of the most famous examples 
before discussing a case in which morally inflected language appears 
alongside judicial error. 
The Supreme Court of the United States spoke forcefully on the subject 
in 1939 in Pepper v. Litton.186  The Court starts by referencing “rules of fair 
play and good conscience” before going on to reference “the standards of 
common decency and honesty.”187  In between, the Court expressly states 
that a fiduciary cannot serve two masters — they must put the needs of the 
entrustor before their own.188  That which is “permitted outsiders in a race of 
creditors” acting at arms-length is barred to the fiduciary.189  More 
specifically, the Court states that a corporate fiduciary cannot use inside 
information and their position for their own gain and cannot do “indirectly 
through the corporation what [they] could not do directly.”190  These 
limitations held, in the Court’s eyes, “no matter how absolute in terms” the 
power of the fiduciary and “no matter how meticulous” the fiduciary is in 
 
 185.  Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 
104 (2d ed. 2013). 
 186.  Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310–11 (1939). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 311. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
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satisfying formal requirements.191  And that limit was equitable.192  The Court 
returned to equity in laying out the consequence:  “Where there is a violation 
of those principles, equity will undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its 
consummation.”193 
The Supreme Court of Delaware used similar language in Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., also issued in 1939.194  The Court begins by stating flat out that 
“[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of 
trust and confidence to further their private interests.”195  The Court does note 
that corporate officers and directors are not trustees.196  Much like Judge 
Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salman, the Court in Guth relies heavily on morally 
inflected language.  The public policy in question has “exist[ed] through the 
years” and is “derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics 
and motives.”197  The result was “a rule that demands . . . peremptorily and 
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance” of a corporate officer’s or 
director’s fiduciary duty and that is “inveterate and uncompromising in its 
rigidity.”198  Corporate officers and directors have both an affirmative duty 
to protect corporate interests and a duty to refrain from injuring the 
corporation or depriving it of profit.199  The loyalty to the corporation must 
be “undivided and unselfish.”200  Failure to meet that standard is a 
“betrayal.”201 
The Court also makes nods toward equity.  Per the Court, it cannot 
formulate a “hard and fast rule” because fiduciary obligations arise in “many 
and varied” contexts.202  Accordingly, there is “no fixed scale” for the loyalty 
standard.203  The Court characterized the rule as based on a broad “foundation 
of a wise public policy” rather than “the narrow ground of injury . . . to the 
corporation.”204  That broad approach, though, brought an ease of 
administrability: where there was breach of fiduciary duty, “a certain result 
 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. (“For that power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not 
be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion 
or detriment of the” entrustor.) (emphasis added). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939), superseded by statute.   
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 198.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
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follows.”205 
Let us turn to a more recent case to see the appearance of morally 
inflected language, in particular, alongside judicial error.  The Estate of 
Rothko trial court opinion206 is open to criticism for the failure to account for 
the estate’s need to generate cash to pay estate taxes and cash bequests.207  
But it is also striking for its morally inflected language.  An executor has a 
“selfish interest.”208  “Rigid adherence” is necessary to remove “all 
temptation.”209  “Divided loyalties” must be “obliterate[d]” and their effects 
“utterly. . .destroy[ed].”210  The actions of the fiduciaries were 
“disheartening.”211 
This sort of language survives in contemporary judicial opinions and in 
the business organization context.212  It shows up even where the applicable 
statute broadly allows for waiver of fiduciary duties and the relevant contract 
does just that.213  And it leads to judges making errors in deciding fiduciary 
obligation cases. 
Equitable reasoning.  In Pappas v. Tzolis, the court ultimately 
enforced the fiduciary duty waiver at issue, but it did not do so on the basis 
of the New York LLC statute.214  The parties had formed an LLC to hold the 
lease on a building in Manhattan, and their operating agreement allowed the 
three members of the LLC to “engage in business ventures and investments 
of any nature whatsoever, whether or not in competition with the LLC.”215  
This is a common approach to waiver in the business organization context 
because it is often advantageous to recruit an investor with existing interests 
in the same line of business.  The LLC was ill-fated and, after numerous 
 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1975).   
 207.  See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 3, at 778–82 (discussing criticisms of the decisions 
by each court). 
 208.  Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at 847. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 848. 
 211.  Id. at 849. 
 212.  See, e.g., AB Group v. Wertin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652, 656 (Ct. App. 1997) (“Equity 
can hardly tolerate—much less impose as a duty—the deliberate attempt to deprive a 
contracting party of the fruits of his or her bargain . . . .  [I]n the equitable matter of partnership 
fiduciary duties . . . ). 
 213.  See, e.g., BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 
817–18 (Ct. App. 1999) (“But the fact that the act allows the parties to structure many aspects 
of their relationship is not a license to freely engage in self-dealing—it remains our 
responsibility to delimit the outer boundaries of permissible conduct by a fiduciary. In view 
of the rule against waiving fundamental fiduciary duties, we cannot stretch these general 
provisions to include giving Equitable a free hand to act for its own self-interest. Equitable 
was still a fiduciary, and its conduct must be measured by fiduciary standards.”). 
 214.  Pappas v. Tzolis, 982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012). 
 215.  Id. at 578. 
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disputes, Tzolis bought out the interests of the other two members.216  The 
accompanying agreement provided that “Tzolis has no fiduciary duty to the 
undersigned Sellers in connection with [the] assignments.”217  Just seven 
months later Tzolis was able to assign the lease for over ten times as much 
as he paid the other members.218 
The LLC in question was governed by the New York LLC Act.  But the 
court did not interpret the NY LLC Act.  Instead, the court relied on a judge-
made — and equitable — rule that waivers are only enforceable if the 
releaser is sophisticated and the relationship is no longer one of 
unquestioning trust.219  The court was correct in enforcing the release, but it 
did so for the wrong reason. 
Reasoning by analogy.  Judges also err in reasoning by analogy rather 
than interpreting the applicable statutory provision.  For example, in USAT 
Reorganization LLC v. Writer, the managers of an LLC had signed a release 
after an earlier dispute.220  Rather than look to the California LLC Act, the 
court relied on partnership precedent, despite the very different language 
used in the two statutes.221 
The most famous statement on fiduciary obligation is from Meinhard v. 
Salmon.222  All three hallmarks of schema-driven judicial decision-making 
are present.  In Meinhard, then-Judge Cardozo declared that “[a] trustee is 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.”223  Honesty 
alone was not enough, but rather “the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive” is require.224  Thus, “the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has] been 
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”225  That was based on 
the “[u]ncompromising rigidity” that “has been the attitude of courts of 
equity.”226  We see morally inflected language.  We see references to courts 
of equity.  And Judge Cardozo analogizes partners and partnerships to 
 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 579 (quoting Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de 
C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001 (N.Y. 2011)).  See also Pace, supra note 39 at 1110–11 
(criticizing the court for applying an equitable rule rather than interpreting the relevant 
statute). 
 220.  USAT Reorganization LLC v. Writer, No. D043230, 2004 WL 2538848, at *2, *16 
(Nov. 10, 2004) (unpublished). 
 221.  Id. at 16–17.  See also Pace, supra note 39 at 1111–12 (criticizing the court for 
applying California partnership precedents rather than interpreting the distinct language of the 
California LLC act).  
 222.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
 223.  Id. at 546. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
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trustees and trusts. 
Scholarly response.  Traditionalists argue that this language matters.  
DeMott argues that judges’ use of a “moral obligation” rationale in fiduciary 
obligation cases shows that judges are employing high social values rather 
than simply attempting to fill a gap in the parties’ agreement.227  Judicial 
opinions communicate information to business-people, attorneys, and other 
judges.228  Regarding moral behavior itself, Frankel argues that self-
enforcing altruistic behavior is considered more moral because moral 
behavior is considered altruistic and voluntary.229  Fiduciaries may not be 
inherently moral, but fiduciary law places fiduciaries “in the role of a moral 
person” and then pressures them to act selflessly.230 
Others argue that the language is harmful or irrelevant.  Williams, for 
example, argues that “[m]oralistic rhetoric” gives a false impression that the 
resulting high expectations are enforceable.231  Other contractarians argue 
that this language does not matter, both because express contractual 
provisions prevail over implicit provisions and because, while “moralizing 
is cost free to judges,” 232 morally inflected language does not “establish[ ] 
that ethics rather than economics best explains the legal rules.”233  But the 
psychology literature suggests otherwise, and too many decisions are 
otherwise unexplainable.  And while economics may continue to better 
explain fiduciary law than ethics, that explanation is stronger if informed by 
behavioral economics and psychology. 
The application of schemas to fiduciaries.  Schemas are one of the 
many shortcuts that the brain uses to perform well despite its natural 
constraints.234  One source for the development of schemas is concrete 
experiences.235  This is troubling in the context of claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  The primary concrete experiences with fiduciary obligation 
of a judge tasked with presiding over a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are 
the cases over which the judge has previously presided.  This is troubling 
 
 227.  DeMott, supra note 98, at 891–92. 
 228.  Cf. Gold, supra note 148, at 505 (“One can view laws as communicating information 
to an audience.”) (citing Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and 
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003)). 
 229.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 830. 
 230.  Id. at 830. 
 231.  Williams, supra note 100, at 369–70.  See also Langbein, supra note 9, at 938 (“The 
very term ‘conflict’ is an epithet that prejudices our understanding.”). 
 232.  Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 2, at 428. 
 233.  Id. at 428 n.6. 
 234.  Accord Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 61 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 582 (1996); Daniel Kahneman 
& Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 
(1974)). 
 235.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 770. 
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because judges only see failed relationships in their courtrooms.236  
Evaluating a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires a causal explanation.  
In seeking that explanation, social observers are quick to “go beyond 
constructing causal explanations and attribute blame to individuals.”237  A 
fiduciary owing explicit duties is an especially attractive scapegoat.238 
Fiduciaries play their own role in developing a schema.  For example, 
when trust administration largely shifted to large financial institutions, trust 
companies consciously sought to build a reputation for trustworthiness 
through marketing.239  But reliance on schemas is not without a cost.  Like 
other mental shortcuts, relying on schemas leaves judges susceptible to 
errors of judgment.240 
Non-expert observers are quicker to blame “dominant role-occupants in 
hierarchal relationships” — such as the traditional fiduciary — than they are 
to blame either party to “nonhierarchical relationships.”241  Judges are no 
different, as they learn to view fiduciaries as subject to stricter legal norms 
than nonfiduciaries.242  That explains one of the reasons fiduciaries will seek 
waivers of their duties ex ante — because “[b]laming the dominant role-
occupant is the default norm for hierarchical relationships.”243  But while 
fiduciaries in the business organization context may superficially resemble a 
dominant role-occupant in a vertical relationship, they are often better 
characterized as parties to horizontal, non-hierarchical relationships.  Thus 
false positive findings of culpability and liability by fiduciaries can be 
expected.  Parties will seek to contract around recourse to the courts when 
they lack faith that the courts will come to the proper conclusion in deciding 
a dispute. 
Schemas provide an explanatory factor as to why courts at least some 
of the time treat modern fiduciaries differently than traditional fiduciaries.  
Per Alexander, people use schemas to categorize a role as hierarchical or 
nonhierarchical.244  The examples Alexander gives highlight the difference.  
Hierarchically structured relationships include “doctor-patient, lawyer-
client, and parent-child relationships,” while nonhierarchically structured 
 
 236.  See, e.g., Pace, supra note 39, at 1089 (noting that although contracts are performed 
successfully 95 percent of the time, judges only see agreements that have failed in some way). 
 237.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 772 (citing Fiske & Taylor, supra note 83–86). 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. at 775. 
 240.  Accord Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 61 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 582 (1996); Daniel Kahneman 
& Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 
(1974)) 
 241.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 774. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
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relationships include “friends, business partners, and co-workers.”245  This 
provides a partial explanation both as to why courts have proven more open 
to limitations on and waivers of fiduciary duties in the business organization 
context and to why they sometimes have proven reticent to enforce such 
waivers.246  Schemas, then, can both reinforce and muddle the divide within 
the law. 
Top-down versus bottom-up analysis.  The psychology literature 
differentiates between top-down and bottom-up modes of cognitive 
analysis.247  Top-down modes of cognitive analysis are “heavily influenced 
by one’s organized prior knowledge.”248  That is, a heavy influence is exerted 
by the “preconceived notions and expectations” of the analyst.249  But where 
top-down modes of analysis are “theory-driven or image-driven,” bottom-up 
modes are “data-driven.”250  As such, they are not as influenced by 
preconceived expectations as top-down processes.251  Alexander further 
ascribes the tendency by judges to apply top-down modes of analysis to 
schemas.252  Schemas also — as an “information gap-filler”253 — fill a 
psychological role similar to that filled by fiduciary obligation in the law.  
Alexander argues that courts do not have a well-developed schema for 
contracting parties, unlike fiduciaries.254  This is likely because contractual 
relationships are incredibly flexible and customizable; they can be extended 
to cover an almost infinite array of relationships.  Courts are right not to 
shove such a broad-based tool into such a narrow box.  Bottom-up processes 
are particularly superior to top-down processes in statutory and contractual 
interpretation. 
Alexander argues that courts evaluate trustees, executors, and estate 
administrators (i.e., property fiduciaries) differently than parties to 
contractual relationships due to cognitive factors.255  Accepting that judges 
analyze traditional fiduciary relationships in such a way, the question is how 
judges analyze fiduciary relationships in more modern contexts, particularly 
in the business organization context.  The highly statutory and contractual 
nature of those relationships and obligations counsels for evaluating them 
 
 245.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 246.  See, e.g., Pace, supra note 39, at 1095–109 (detailing case law upholding waivers of 
fiduciary duties in the LLC context). 
 247.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 768. 
 248.  Fiske & Taylor, supra note 185, at 104. 
 249.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 768 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, 
SOCIAL COGNITION 104 (2d ed. 2013). 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. at 771. 
 254.  Id. at 769. 
 255.  Id. at 768. 
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more like contractual relationships, but the language from cases like Pepper 
v. Litton, Guth v. Loft, Inc., and Meinhard v. Salmon shows judges talking 
about them much like they would a traditional, equitable fiduciary 
relationship.  This is in keeping with Alexander’s application of cognitive 
theory, or behavioral decision theory, to fiduciary law.256 
Cognitive biases.  Judicial error stemming from applying schemas 
associated with traditional fiduciary relationships to modern fiduciary 
relationships is compounded by the close association of schemas with 
cognitive biases.  Schemas are especially closely associated with the 
conservatism bias and thus highly resistant to cognitive change.257  The 
conservatism bias is defined as the tendency to underestimate and undervalue 
the importance of new evidence.258  Schemas have an anchoring effect that 
exacerbates the conservatism bias.259  Commentators have noted that 
cognitive biases afflict parties to agreements curtailing fiduciary duties260 
and judges deciding breach of fiduciary duty cases.261 
Schemas also operate in conjunction with cognitive phenomena such as 
hindsight bias.262  Alexander defines hindsight bias as “individuals’ tendency 
to consistently exaggerate what, in foresight, they could have anticipated”; 
that is, people persistently believe that they could and should have known ex 
ante what they know ex post.263  To put it another way, after the fact, people 
greatly overrate the ease with which an event could have been anticipated.264  
Combatting hindsight bias is difficult because it is unnatural to ignore a 
known outcome.265 
Hindsight bias is particularly dangerous for fiduciaries.  To weigh a 
fiduciary’s conduct, judges must often engage in the unnatural act of 
assessing “the predictability of past outcomes.”266  Rachlinksi has argued that 
 
 256.  Id. (citing Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal 
Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious 
Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000)). 
 257.  Id. at 772 (citing Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, 
Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 359 (1982) (“An abundance of research 
has shown that human beings are conservative processors of fallible information.”)). 
 258.  Kahneman & Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCI. at 1125. 
 259.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 772 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. at 1128). 
 260.  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 249–51 (1995). 
 261.  Pace, supra note 39, at 1089. 
 262.  Alexander, supra note 3, at 782. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 67. 
 265.  Id. at 69. 
 266.  Id. (“Few decisions in ordinary life require an assessment of the predictability of past 
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hindsight bias pervades judicial decisions on improper investment of trust 
assets by trustees.267  The fiduciary schema reinforces hindsight bias.268  No 
better example of hindsight bias in pernicious effect can be given than a court 
holding that a trustee’s sale of stock from a diversified portfolio violated the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties because he sold the stock “at the bottom of the 
market.”269  Bedrock principles of finance fell to hindsight bias.270  There is 
no easy fix.  Rachlinski argues that any effort to address hindsight bias by 
courts must recognize “there is no effective strategy to induce a judge . . . to 
make an unbiased ex post assessment of the ex ante probability of an adverse 
outcome.”271 
Legislatures have acted more than judges to address hindsight bias, both 
in general and in ways that specifically apply to fiduciaries.  The burden of 
production and the standard of proof typically place a greater encumbrance 
on the plaintiff, the party most likely to benefit from hindsight bias.272  
Rachlinski frames the business judgment rule as in part a reaction to the 
deleterious effect of hindsight bias on determinations of liability.273  He also 
sees bright-line rules as a sensible attempt at mitigating harm from hindsight 
bias.274  In the context of trustee investments of trust assets, Rachlinski sees 
both the occasional application of what amounts to a strict liability standard 
and standards focused on “whether the trustee was adequately informed 
before investing” as such attempts.275 
Hindsight bias has proven especially prevalent in regards to trustee 
investments of trust assets.  Even after the advent of the prudent investor 
rule, judges “repeatedly condemned trustees for purchasing ‘speculative’ 
investments such as shares of stock bought on margin, ‘bonds selling at a 
large discount because of uncertainty as to whether they will be paid at 
maturity,’ junior mortgages, and real estate,” even where held in well 
 
outcomes, but such assessments are pervasive in legal contexts.”).  See also 3 AUSTIN 
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 227, at 433 (4th ed. 
1988) (“It is difficult for a judge . . . to disregard the lesson taught by subsequent events and 
to put himself in the position in which the trustee was when he acted.”) 
 267.  Id. at 73. 
 268.  See Alexander, supra note 3, at 783 (arguing it does so in trust litigation). 
 269.  First Alabama Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428 (Ala. 1982). 
 270.  But see Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Mgt. and the Prudent Man Rule 18 
(1986) (characterizing Martin as an exceptional case of judicial “backwardness and 
irrationality”). 
 271.  Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 70 (emphasis added). 
 272.  Id. at 71. 
 273.  Id. at 72–73. 
 274.  Id. at 78 (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight versus Judging 
Liability in Hindsight: The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813, 830–31 (1999)). 
 275.  Id. 
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diversified portfolios.276  Judges have shown both financial illiteracy and 
hindsight bias.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled against 
a trustee for investments making up just a small fraction of a diverse portfolio 
due to “disquieting information” in the relevant disclosures.277  The Alabama 
Supreme Court did them one better, taking a trustee to task for selling “at the 
bottom of the market.”278 
It should come as no surprise, then, that judicial thinking has not kept 
up with the evolution of fiduciary law.  The cognitive ability of 
policymakers, though, has been a grossly understudied topic in the existing 
literature.279  This Article begins to address that imbalance, but considerably 
more attention is warranted, including empirical work utilizing both surveys 
and experimental methods. 
V. OPTIMIZING MODERN STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL 
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
This divide in fiduciary law and the reasons for it have been 
underappreciated and have important implications for how we approach 
fiduciary law.  Statute has largely come to supplant equity as the definer of 
fiduciary relationships and obligations.  With this has come a greatly 
increased role for legislatures and a decreased role for judges.  Business 
organizations, and especially alternative business entities, are particularly 
well suited for modern, statutory and contractual fiduciary obligation.  
Beyond the business organization context, the modern, statutory and 
contractual form of fiduciary obligation is better suited to meeting the needs 
of parties in a large array of new types of fiduciary relationships, because 
legislatures are better positioned to address those needs and because statutory 
and contractual definition allows for the flexibility to fit fiduciary obligation 
to such diverse relationships.  Bolting on fiduciary obligation statutorily and 
customizing it as needed is a rational response to a basic design problem.  
And while moral considerations should not be discounted, it may that they, 
too, counsel in favor of this approach. 
 
 276.  See id. at 76 (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, 
THE LAW OF TRUSTS 227.6, at 444; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 227 cmt. F (1959); 
First Ala. Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1982); Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585 (Pa. 
Super. 1983); Steiner v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 393 P.2d 96 (Haw. 1964)). 
 277.  Chase v. Pevear, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Mass. 1981). 
 278.  First Ala. Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428 (Ala. 1982). 
 279.  Niclas Berggren, Time for Behavioral Political Economy? An Analysis of Articles in 
Behavioral Economics (finding that 95.5% of studied articles in behavioral economics fail to 
analyze the cognitive ability of policymakers), available at http://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1846184 [https://perma.cc/YG8M-CQZQ]. 
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As we’ve seen, fiduciary law’s roots are equitable.280  It arose out of 
certain sorts of relationships.  It was focused on the status of the fiduciary.  
It was focused on a relationship between the fiduciary and entrustor where 
the fiduciary was in a position of trust and given discretion by an entrustor 
not in a position to effectively monitor the fiduciary. 
That can certainly be the case in the modern business organization 
context.  But it is frequently not.  And whether it is or is not is not relevant 
— fiduciary duties are owed nonetheless.  The court will not look to whether 
the entrustor trusted the fiduciary, or whether the fiduciary was given 
discretion, or whether the entrustor was in a position to effectively monitor 
the fiduciary; the court will only look to whether the relevant statute provides 
that the first party was in a role such that they owed fiduciary duties to the 
second party.  And then the court will look to any relevant contract. 
Statutory rules regarding how fiduciary relationships may be defined 
are not at odds with the contractarian approach because they are “best 
understood as implicit contractual terms.”281  But to term fiduciary law 
contractarian is a bit of a misnomer because statutes, organizational 
documents, and contracts can combine to delineate the contours of the 
fiduciary relationship.  Where the statute provides for it, organizational 
documents and contracts serve as gap-fillers where the statute either does not 
speak or devolves decision-making power. 
Judges often apply the same schema for modern fiduciary obligations 
with statutory or contractual roots as they do for traditional fiduciary 
obligations.  To put it another way, judges analogize the relationships of the 
former with the relationships of the latter.282  But modern fiduciary 
obligations are different in kind than traditional fiduciary obligations.283  
Because the authority for the fiduciary obligation flows from a statutory or 
contractual source, the schema described above no longer fits.  Judges should 
abandon the top-down approach to analyzing fiduciary obligations in favor 
of a bottom-up analysis.284  What was once amenable to a single schema now 
may come in as many flavors as legislatures and entrepreneurs can devise.  
 
 280.  See supra Part II (discussing how equity has shaped fiduciary obligations). 
 281.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 429 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)). 
 282.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 804. 
 283.  Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 425 (“During the last two centuries, 
courts have been adapting this duty of loyalty and its remedy to other agency relations, under 
the title ‘fiduciary’ duty.  That is adaption, not extension.”). 
 284.  There is evidence that judges’ interpretative methods can and do change over time. 
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A 
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1311 
(2018) (identifying a divide between older judges—labeled “legal process institutionalists”—
who view statutory interpretation as a “quasi-legislative activity” and younger judges—
labeled “canonists”—who take a “more rule-oriented approach”). 
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Attempting to shoehorn fiduciary duties from the trust or other traditional 
contexts without looking to the relevant statute, contract, or both, will result 
in unsatisfactory rules.285 
There is a reflexive recoiling at the idea that fiduciary duties in, say, the 
LLC context may be waived.  That reflex is based on thinking about fiduciary 
obligation in terms of its equitable roots.  Part of getting away from that and 
properly understanding the role of fiduciary duties in the business 
organization context is a recognition that they are just a component that the 
parties to a contractual relationship within certain statutorily prescribed 
bounds take off or leave on the figurative shelf.  They are just another piece 
in how the parties choose to define their relationships, not any sort of moral 
obligation. 
The limitations of equity.  Equity cannot fully explain fiduciary law 
because it is limited.  For example, at the time of the American Revolution, 
the British Court of Chancery lacked “equitable jurisdiction to grant or 
extend derivative standing” in the corporate context unless there was a 
“threat to justice.”286  The LLC and other alternative business entities did not 
exist in 1792.287  As creatures of statute, they did not even exist at common 
law.288  Rules of equity have a place in Delaware LLC law, but only where 
not abrogated by statute.289  Equity serves at the mercy of statute, not the 
other way around. 
Equity itself is a gap-filler.290  There is only a role for equity where 
remedies have not been provided for at law.291  If the legislature has acted to 
define the remedy, even if in doing so it has limited that remedy or provided 
for private parties to limit that remedy by agreement, then there is no place 
for equity.292  Because it provides for default fiduciary duties, allows for 
contractual limitation on the modification of those duties, and even allows 
 
 285.  Cf. Frankel, supra note 4, at 797 (arguing that developing fiduciary law by 
analogizing to preexisting fiduciary relations often does not result in appropriate rules). 
 286.  CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011). 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id.  LLCs did not exist in the United States until 1977 (first in Wyoming) and in 
Delaware until 1992. 
 289.  Id. (“[I]f the General Assembly has defined a right, remedy, or obligation with 
respect to an LLC, courts cannot interpret the common law to override the express provisions 
the General Assembly adopted.”) (relying on 6 DEL. C. § 18-1104 (“In any case not provided 
for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern.”). 
 290.  Cf. Prod. Res. Gp., LLC v. NCT Gp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789–90 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(criticizing the equitable use of fiduciary duty to “fill gaps that do not exist”). 
 291.  Cf. Chavin v. H.H. Rosin & Co., 246 A.2d 921, 922 (Del. 1968) (“It is, of course, 
axiomatic that Equity has no jurisdiction over a controversy for which there is a complete and 
adequate remedy at law.”). 
 292.  See, e.g., CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2011) (refusing to extend 
equitable remedies to a party that “could have negotiated its remedies by contract”). 
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those duties to be expanded, the Delaware LLC Act, for example, provides 
ample means for LLC members to protect themselves at law.293 
The case for continued aggressive extension of equitable fiduciary 
obligation is even weaker outside of Delaware.  Other states do not retain 
separate equity courts as Delaware does294 and do not have Delaware’s 
constitutional protection of equitable jurisdiction.295  In the federal context, 
the United States Constitution extended the federal judicial power to cover 
cases in equity,296 and Congress, rather than establish separate courts of 
equity, gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases in law and equity.297  
Leading early commentators saw equity playing a gap-filling role in federal 
courts as well.  Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 83 that the equity 
courts’ primary role “is to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are 
exceptions to general rules.”298  And Justice Joseph Story wrote in 1836 in 
his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence that there must be cases where 
the application of existing rules will either result in injustice or where those 
rules “cannot be applied at all.”299  In 1839 the Supreme Court held that 
federal courts sitting in equity were bound to follow state laws creating or 
eliminating substantive rights, regardless of whether the right existed in 
English chancery.300  In 1945 the Supreme Court clarified that, under the Erie 
doctrine, federal courts’ equitable powers should not change the outcome of 
a suit just because it was litigated in federal rather than state court.301  While 
federal courts remain free to apply traditional federal equity rules to rights 
arising under federal statutes,302 they remain limited by the general principle 
 
 293.  Cf. In Re Carlisle, Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“The LLC Act 
provides even more means for a creditor to protect itself at law.”) (citations omitted). 
 294.  The only states that still have separate courts for law and equity are Delaware, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee. 
 295.  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.  See also DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951) 
(“We think the Constitutions of 1792, 1831 and 1897 intended to establish for the benefit of 
the people of the state a tribunal to administer the remedies and principles of equity . . . . Its 
result is to establish by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution the irreducible minimum of 
the judiciary.”).  
 296.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 297.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 11 (“[T]he circuit courts shall have original 
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at 
common law or in equity. . . .”), 25 (“[A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest 
court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, . . . may be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States. . . .”) 
(emphases added). 
 298.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 299.  Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: as administered in England 
and America 9 (W.H. Lyon, Jr. eds., 14th ed. 1918). 
 300.  Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. 195, 203–04 (1839). 
 301.  Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945). 
 302.  Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). 
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of equity that equitable relief is not available where an adequate remedy at 
law is available. 
Moreover, the source and authority for the application and enforcement 
of modern fiduciary obligations is not rooted in equity or based on the status 
or relationship of the parties alone, but flows from the relevant statute, 
contract, or both.303  Equity has a long history placing great store in judicial 
discretion.304  That same level of discretion is inappropriate in the statutory 
and contractual context.  With the increasing importance of federal law, the 
equitable establishment of fiduciary obligation, as opposed to statutory 
obligation, is increasingly being foreclosed.305 
A question best left for legislatures.  Where courts have found 
fiduciary obligations, they have done so in the absence of a statutory 
directive by analogizing the relationship in question to a traditional 
relationship, typically that of a trustee to a trust.306  But legislatures have now 
acted to extend fiduciary obligations by statute to a wide array of 
relationships.307  No longer can judges assume that legislatures have left the 
establishment of fiduciary obligations to the courts.  Legislatures are clearly 
aware of fiduciary obligation and provide for fiduciary obligations and 
relationships as they deem necessary. 
An increased role by legislatures may also help to mitigate hindsight 
and other biases that have plagued adjudication of breach of fiduciary duty 
cases.308  Of course they are not without biases and flaws of their own.  In 
fact, legislatures serve as both an outside source of reform to mitigate judicial 
bias and as another source of cognitive bias.309  The comparison between 
legislatures and judges in this context deserve its own full-length treatment, 
but legislatures are at most no worse than judges.  More to the point, 
legislatures have taken advantage of their prerogative to supplant the courts 
as the definers of fiduciary obligation. 
 
 303.  But see Smith, supra note 93, at 1792–94 (arguing contractually adopted fiduciary 
duties should be treated as contractual duties, not fiduciary duties). 
 304.  Bray, supra note 12, at 5 (identifying discretion as one of the hallmarks of equity’s 
distinctive mode of reasoning). 
 305.  Cf. Frankel, supra note 4, at 820 n.79 (noting that, because the Supreme Court has 
curbed federal common law, federal courts must follow legislation more closely in developing 
fiduciary law). 
 306.  See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not 
trustees, [corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and 
its stockholders.”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (“A trustee is held to 
something stricter than the morals of the market place.”). 
 307.  See, e.g., supra Part III (exploring the increasing role of statute and contract in 
creating, defining, and limiting fiduciary obligations). 
 308.  See supra Part V (identifying and critiquing the “schema” that judges apply when 
analyzing questions of fiduciary obligation and discussing other issues of cognition). 
 309.  Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 101. 
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It is also salutary to think of fiduciary law in statutory, rather than 
contractual, terms.  The contractarians, as befits the name, tend to start at the 
contract, casting statutes and organizational documents as providing implied 
contractual terms.  In this context, at least, it is more useful to think of it in 
the other direction.  A legislature defines a fiduciary relationship by statute 
but may delegate some part of defining that relationship to private parties 
through organizational documents or contract. 
Business organization context.  Cases involving business 
organizations have come to dominate the case law.  This has occurred as 
business organizations have both vastly increased in overall economic heft 
and proliferated in form.310  In particular, the rise of alternative business 
entities has made equitable reasoning and analogies to traditional fiduciaries 
a poor fit in the business organization context, and nowhere less so than for 
LLCs.  LLCs are products of statute and creatures of contract.311  Given their 
flexibility, they are a poor fit for reasoning by analogy to trusts and for the 
top-down application of a schema better suited for such.  Additionally, 
business organizations do not raise the same concerns as many traditional 
fiduciary relationships.  Entrustors that can protect themselves from abuses 
of power obviate the need for judicial intervention through fiduciary law.312  
For publicly traded corporations, shareholders have the ultimate source of 
market protection: easy exit.  Even for forms used for closely held 
businesses, the owners have the opportunity to protect themselves during an 
arms-length formation process.  Viewed from that perspective, the 
traditionalist entrustor-fiduciary paradigm breaks down.  Parties enter at 
arms-length and frequently risk opportunistic behavior from each other; but 
if contractual protections prove insufficient in the aggregate, legislatures can 
constrain waivers of fiduciary duties, as they have done with only a very few 
exceptions such as the Delaware LLC and LP Acts.313 
Wide-ranging fiduciary obligations.  Business organizations get more 
attention, but legislatures have acted to create or redefine fiduciary 
obligations in a wide array of situations.314  Justification for analogy to trust 
or other traditional fiduciary relationships breaks down in light of the much 
broader range of relationships that now bring fiduciary obligations.  Sitkoff 
points out that there is “a rich body of interpretative authority on fiduciary 
matters,” but much of that case law interprets particular statutory language. 
 
 310.  See supra Part III (discussing the expanding role of business organizations in 
defining fiduciary obligations). 
 311.  Pace, supra note 39, at 1086. 
 312.  Frankel, supra note 4, at 811. 
 313.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§18-1101(c) (LLCs), 17-1101(d) (LPs). 
 314.  See supra Part III (explaining the expansion of fiduciary obligations created and 
defined by statute). 
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315  Fiduciary law has not only spread; it is increasingly customized to fit the 
needs of particular categories of relationships. 
There are two conclusions to draw from this.  One, legislatures are well 
aware of fiduciary obligation.  Courts should first look to see if there is a 
relevant statute.  If there is, there is no need for judge-made, equitable rules.  
Judges should appreciate that the different needs of diverse, modern 
relationships have led to different approaches to and refinements of fiduciary 
obligation.  Two, only where the legislature has not spoken — including 
implicitly — and where no relief is available does a role remain for judge-
made, equitable rules.  This does not include situations where the legislature 
has provided for limited fiduciary duties or for the waiver of duties by the 
parties.  Accordingly, it is most likely to arise in new types of relationships.  
This approach retains flexibility to suit fiduciary law to a modern, changing 
economy. 
Rational approach to the design problem.  The decision by 
legislatures to “bolt on” fiduciary obligation to new and diverse types of 
relationships has a sound rationale.  Legal systems are complex.316  The 
modern American legal system has grown into a sprawling, intricate system.  
This has come at a price — “the cognitive load of interacting with a system 
increases with the number of components.”317  Legislatures have a strong 
incentive to mitigate the legal system’s complexity; but they also have an 
incentive to expand the system to meet the needs of a growing and changing 
economy.  These are in tension but are not mutually exclusive.318  One way 
to mitigate the costs associated with complexity while expanding the system 
is to use a modular design.319  Modular design allows legislatures to bolt on 
legal components borrowed from part of the system onto another.  In doing 
so, they “(1) reduce the cognitive load faced by both designers and users; (2) 
make it easier to modify the system by reducing the number of 
interdependencies, among its components, and (3) create ‘standardized 
modules’ that can be reused when creating new systems with similar 
functionality.”320 
 
 315.  Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 1044. 
 316.  Herbert Simon defined a complex system as “one made up of a large number of parts 
that interact in a nonsimple way.”  HERBERT SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 86 
(M.I.T. Press 1 ed. 1969).  One piece of the American legal system, the Code of Federal 
Regulations, stood at 175,496 pages at year-end 2013.  
 317.  Manuel A. Utset, Financial System Engineering, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 371, 
410 (2013). 
 318.  Cf. id. at 407 (“One can reduce the overall level of complexity without reducing the 
number of rules, or even by adding new ones, by making their interaction more transparent 
and easier to understand.”). 
 319.  See generally id. at 411-14 (describing modular design and its use). 
 320.  Id. at 412. 
PACE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  4:12 PM 
2018]  EQUITY, THE PROMISE ECONOMY, AND COGNITION 727 
 
Legislatures are mostly still part-time at the state level321 and lack the 
time, resources, and expertise to design new additions to the legal system 
from scratch.  They ease their cognitive load by borrowing components from 
existing laws in their own state and elsewhere.  Fiduciary obligation is one 
of those components.  We have discussed the cognitive limitations humans 
face in processing and responding to information.322  These limitations 
manifest as bounded rationality, which leads humans to make sub-optimal 
decisions.323  Because those limitations are in part due to “limited 
computational skills,”324 reducing the complexity of a system users — here, 
fiduciaries and entrustors — are forced to interact with will mitigate the 
negative effects of cognitive limitations.  Bolting fiduciary obligation onto a 
wide variety of types of relationships allows legislatures to meet their goals 
of providing a level of protection to entrustors while reducing the cognitive 
load on fiduciaries and entrustors.  Using a standardized model of fiduciary 
obligation has allowed legislatures to bolt existing law onto new areas of the 
law from investment advisory services to labor unions to employee benefits 
plans.325 
Customization to fit the particular needs of those disparate relationships 
does add complexity.  Legislatures, then, have an incentive to limit the 
customization at the statutory level and to delegate defining the full contours 
of the fiduciary relationship where significant, individualized customization 
is expected to be beneficial.  Such customization will frequently be beneficial 
because market constraints — including contractual constraints — are often 
more effective at a lower cost than regulatory constraints.326  Ease of 
modification, both by legislatures and by private parties, is affected by 
interdependencies between fiduciary obligations and other components.  The 
subject has received scant attention, but in at least one context, there is 
evidence parties are well aware of those interdependencies.  A study of 
publicly traded LLCs found that modifications to the duty of loyalty were 
often paired with a unanimous consent requirement to amend the operating 
 
 321.  The National Conference of State Legislatures only classifies legislatures in four 
states — California, New York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania — as having full-time, well paid 
legislators with large staff.  Full- and Part-time Legislatures, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legis
latures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx [https://perma.cc/MXG8-B5XW]. 
 322.  See supra Part V (discussing the development of the law by exploring human 
cognition). 
 323.  Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998). 
 324.  Id. at 1477. 
 325.  See supra Part III (explaining how the statutes and contracts were used to “bolt-on” 
fiduciary obligations in new areas of the law). 
 326.  Utset, supra note 169, at 546. 
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agreement in the future.327 
The advantages of this design approach, though, are threatened by 
judicial intervention.  A top-down analysis burdened by an outdated 
cognitive schema328 increases costs of customization by increasing 
uncertainty for both legislatures and private parties.  This may have the effect 
of increasing the number of interdependencies among fiduciary obligation 
and other areas of the law.  That uncertainty adds to the cost of continuing to 
bolt fiduciary obligation onto new areas of the law and types of relationships 
and of forming a relationship that bring fiduciary obligations with it, 
especially if the parties desire to modify those obligations.  A bottom-up 
approach to analyzing issues of fiduciary obligation would only moderately 
add to the cognitive load of judges while allowing legislatures and private 
parties to reap the benefit of bolting on fiduciary obligation.329 
Fiduciary obligation may crowd out actual morality.  That is not to 
say that trust and morality do not have an important role to play in fiduciary 
relationships of all types.  Rational choice theory would suggest that 
fiduciaries, especially in the business organization context, have a strong 
incentive to shirk and self-deal, because the benefits of doing so would inure 
to the fiduciary, the costs would be spread across the owners of the business, 
and the likelihood of discovery (and a subsequent judgment of culpability 
and liability) are low.  This is one reason why traditionalists point to the role 
of fiduciary law in enforcing social norms.  Contrary to their concerns, 
though, the case law reveals less rapacious behavior than we might expect 
from viewing actors as entirely self-interested.330  And there is experimental 
evidence that cuts against the rational, self-interested presumption.  For 
example, people are less likely to succumb to the Prisoner’s Dilemma than 
game theory predicts.331  People both trust and behave in a trustworthy 
manner to a greater extent than market or legal incentives alone would 
produce.332  And one study suggests that a more market-based system may 
 
 327.  Harner and Marincic, supra note 83, at 909, n.122 (finding a unanimity require-ment 
in 48.9% of agreements modifying or eliminating the duty of loyalty but in only 29.4% of the 
agreements not doing so). 
 328.  See supra Part V (explaining the concept of a schema in psychology and cognitive 
science). 
 329.  But of course both legislatures and private parties will make mistakes.  See 
Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 63 (“Experts who design [complex systems or structures] 
commonly fail to foresee ways in which complicated processes can go awry.”). 
 330.  See, e.g., Pace, supra note 39 (exhaustively surveying the applicable case law in 24 
states that allow extensive or full waiver in the LLC context). 
 331.  See Richard H. Thaler, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
143–46 (1st ed. 2016) (giving real life examples and describing experiments showing more 
cooperation than suggested by the Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
 332.  Blair and Stout, supra note 113, at 1738. 
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better encourage honesty than a more centrally-planned system.333 
That is a very good thing, because business organizations, in particular, 
cannot exist without cooperation and trust.  Blair and Stout believe that trust 
plays a critical role not just in non-profit institutions but also in the business 
corporation.334  Trust is even more important for privately held alternative 
business entities.  Where market constraints post-formation are weaker, 
participants must deal with each other more frequently, and the availability 
of opportunism may be greater.  But even in large, publicly held 
corporations, parties cooperate because of both internal and external 
constraints.335 
In light of this, designing an optimal approach to the problems fiduciary 
law seeks to address is no easy task.  The promise of reward and threat of 
punishment is not always the best way to promote cooperation.336  In fact, a 
system of external threats and rewards can actually lead to decreased 
cooperation.  Such attempts may “reduce levels of trust and trustworthiness 
within the firm by eroding corporate participants’ internal motivations.”337  
And external incentives may even lead to worse outcomes than if there were 
no external incentives.338  Even a contractual penalty such as a liquidated 
damages provision may increase the likelihood of efficient breach.339  
Certainly in the business organization context, where fiduciary duties look 
and act much like contractual provisions, the possibility that fiduciary duties 
will increase the likelihood of a breach of those duties must be taken into 
account.  It also suggests that the intuitive evaluation of the effect of waiver 
of fiduciary duties may be off-base.340  All of this suggests that morality and 
social norms have a role to play in fiduciary law, but that the contours of that 
role are not as easily discerned as we may suspect.  This counsels both in 
 
 333.  See Dan Ariely et al., The (True) Legacy of Two Really Existing Economic Systems, 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-26, at 9 (March 19, 2015), available at http://epub.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/20974 [https://perma.cc/3CMQ-GHEF] (reporting a study finding that subjects 
with an East German background cheated twice as much in an experiment as subjects with a 
West German background).   
 334.  Blair and Stout, supra note 113, at 1739. 
 335.  Id. at 1737–38. 
 336.  Id. at 1739. 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  See generally, SAMUEL BOWLES, THE MORAL ECONOMY: WHY GOOD INCENTIVES 
ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR GOOD CITIZENS 39–77 (Yale Univ. Press 2016) (reporting 
experiments where external incentives led to less optimal results than no external incentives). 
 339.  See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A 
Psychology Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633 (2010) (reporting experimental findings that 
liquidated damages provisions make breach of contract more likely). 
 340.  What is even less clear is what the effect of just modifying, not waiving, fiduciary 
duties would be.  It may be that it makes breach more likely, but it also may be that it makes 
breach less likely. 
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favor of caution and in favor of allowing legislatures to experiment with 
different approaches to fiduciary obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
To divide fiduciary obligation into two bodies of law instead of one is 
a simplification, but it is a necessary simplification.341  Nor is it the only way 
to describe fiduciary law, but it is rooted in the historical development of 
fiduciary obligation and it bridges the divide between the traditionalist and 
contractarian camps in the literature.  More importantly, it identifies the 
primary problem with the current approach — that judges too often apply a 
schema better suited for traditional, equitable fiduciary obligations top-down 
instead of engaging in a bottom-up analysis — and establishes that the 
modern, statutory and contractual approach is sensible in light of changes in 
the law and the economy and is advantageous from a design standpoint. 
Fiduciary obligation has grown into two distinct bodies of law.  But the 
language used over and over again by courts, reflecting the schema 
frequently applied by courts, remains rooted in only one of those two bodies 
of law.  Reducing the rate of judicial error in breach of fiduciary duty cases 
requires a recognition that those two distinct bodies of law exist and the 
abandonment of schema-driven thinking in favor of bottom-up analysis.  
That will, in part, require a recognition that the definition and modification 
of fiduciary obligations by statute and contract is equally valid to equitable, 
relationship-based fiduciary obligation.  Both Congress and state legislature 
can be expected to continue to expand fiduciary obligation to new 
relationships, define its contours, and delegate further definition of its 
contours to private parties.  They should be encouraged to do so, in large part 
because borrowing traditional, equitable fiduciary obligation and bolting it 
onto new areas of the law is lower cost than creating a substitute from 
scratch.  That cost will be further reduced by judges moving to a bottom-up 





 341.  Cf. Anne Tucker, Jeffrey Lipshaw: Regarding Uncorporations, Is Contract a King 
or Mere Pretender to the Throne? (Micro-symposium), Bus. L. Prof Blog (Nov. 16, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/11/jeff-lipshaw-regarding-
uncorporations-is-contract-a-king-or-mere-pretender-to-the-throne-micro-sympo.html 
[https://perma.cc/7M2Z-NU5X]. (“The contractual, corporate, and uncorporate models are 
always reductions in the bits and bytes of information from the complex reality, and that’s 
what makes them useful, just as a map of Cambridge, Massachusetts that was as complex as 
the real Cambridge would be useless.”). 
